Zola MCP Server

zola-mcp npm v1.12.0 Source verified

Published by chrischall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Zola wedding MCP server for Claude

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/bundle.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.js:2952`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/bundle.js

Tools 76

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • search_registry_productsingests untrusted input
  • search_themesingests untrusted input
  • add_faqno sensitive capability
  • add_guestno sensitive capability
  • add_home_sectionno sensitive capability
  • add_poino sensitive capability
  • add_registry_itemno sensitive capability
  • add_travel_itemno sensitive capability
  • add_vendorno sensitive capability
  • assign_seatno sensitive capability
Show 66 more tools ↓
  • create_card_projectno sensitive capability
  • get_budgetno sensitive capability
  • get_card_projectno sensitive capability
  • get_card_project_guestsno sensitive capability
  • get_card_suiteno sensitive capability
  • get_current_themeno sensitive capability
  • get_gift_trackerno sensitive capability
  • get_inquiry_conversationno sensitive capability
  • get_registryno sensitive capability
  • get_rsvp_pageno sensitive capability
  • get_seating_chartno sensitive capability
  • get_storefrontno sensitive capability
  • get_website_customizationsno sensitive capability
  • get_wedding_dashboardno sensitive capability
  • get_wedding_settingsno sensitive capability
  • invite_guest_to_eventno sensitive capability
  • list_card_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_eventsno sensitive capability
  • list_faqsno sensitive capability
  • list_favorite_card_suitesno sensitive capability
  • list_favoritesno sensitive capability
  • list_guestsno sensitive capability
  • list_home_sectionsno sensitive capability
  • list_inquiriesno sensitive capability
  • list_pagesno sensitive capability
  • list_poisno sensitive capability
  • list_seating_chartsno sensitive capability
  • list_travel_itemsno sensitive capability
  • list_unseated_guestsno sensitive capability
  • list_vendorsno sensitive capability
  • mark_inquiry_readno sensitive capability
  • preview_card_templateno sensitive capability
  • preview_qrcodeno sensitive capability
  • reconcile_registryno sensitive capability
  • remove_event_invitationno sensitive capability
  • remove_faqno sensitive capability
  • remove_guestno sensitive capability
  • remove_home_sectionno sensitive capability
  • remove_poino sensitive capability
  • remove_registry_itemno sensitive capability
  • remove_travel_itemno sensitive capability
  • remove_vendorno sensitive capability
  • reorder_pagesno sensitive capability
  • search_card_catalogno sensitive capability
  • search_storefrontsno sensitive capability
  • search_vendorsno sensitive capability
  • set_card_project_guestsno sensitive capability
  • set_card_project_qrcodeno sensitive capability
  • set_event_guestsno sensitive capability
  • set_page_hiddenno sensitive capability
  • swap_card_project_variationno sensitive capability
  • track_rsvpsno sensitive capability
  • update_budget_itemno sensitive capability
  • update_current_themeno sensitive capability
  • update_eventno sensitive capability
  • update_faqno sensitive capability
  • update_guest_addressno sensitive capability
  • update_home_sectionno sensitive capability
  • update_pageno sensitive capability
  • update_poino sensitive capability
  • update_registry_itemno sensitive capability
  • update_travel_itemno sensitive capability
  • update_vendorno sensitive capability
  • update_website_customizationno sensitive capability
  • update_wedding_settingsno sensitive capability
  • validate_card_projectno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 10

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.12.0 latest A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v1.11.0 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-04
v1.10.0 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-30
v1.8.1 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-29
v1.7.5 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-28
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.7.4 A 94/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-09
v1.7.3 A 94/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-05
v1.6.6 A 94/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-01
v1.6.5 A 94/100 1 1.12.1 2026-07-29
v1.6.4 A 94/100 1 1.12.1 2026-07-27

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan zola-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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