Ziniao MCP Server
ziniao
PyPI
v0.2.80
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
紫鸟与 Chrome 浏览器 AI 自动化 — 让 AI Agent 操控紫鸟店铺与本地 Chrome
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Dynamic code execution in server code (ziniao_mcp/cli/dispatch.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`ziniao_mcp/cli/dispatch.py:1307`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = await Promise.resolve(eval(inj.expression)); }} catch(e) {{}} }} if (val != null) {{ h[inj.header] =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ziniao_mcp/cli/dispatch.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (ziniao_mcp/flows/runner.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`ziniao_mcp/flows/runner.py:346`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Any] = {} exec(compile(wrapped, "<flow_code>", "exec"), g, loc) # noqa: S102 return loc.get(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ziniao_mcp/flows/runner.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (ziniao_mcp/chrome_passive.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ziniao_mcp/chrome_passive.py:161`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , ) process = subprocess.Popen( # pylint: disable=consider-using-with args, stdout=subproce
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ziniao_mcp/chrome_passive.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/lifecycle.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/lifecycle.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["tasklist", "/FI", "IMAGENAME eq ziniao.exe", "/FO", "CSV", "/NH"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/lifecycle.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/skill_cmd.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/skill_cmd.py:95`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port subprocess subprocess.run( ["cmd", "/c", "mklink", "/J", str(target_dir), str(source_dir)],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/skill_cmd.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/update_cmd.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/update_cmd.py:88`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [uv_exe, "tool", "dir"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ziniao_mcp/cli/commands/update_cmd.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (ziniao_mcp/cli/connection.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ziniao_mcp/cli/connection.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ETACHED_PROCESS subprocess.Popen( # pylint: disable=consider-using-with [exe, "-m", daemon_module],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ziniao_mcp/cli/connection.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([network_unroute, page_fetch]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file, har_stop]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [network_unroute, page_fetch] → sinks [upload_file, har_stop]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow network_unroute → upload_file
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/cli_test_all.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/cli_test_all.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: r = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/cli_test_all.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/e2e_cookie_vault_isolated_restore.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/e2e_cookie_vault_isolated_restore.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cmd += argv proc = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/e2e_cookie_vault_isolated_restore.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/rakuten_presets_smoke.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/rakuten_presets_smoke.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: p = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/rakuten_presets_smoke.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test_minimal_env.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test_minimal_env.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }", flush=True) proc = subprocess.Popen( # pylint: disable=consider-using-with cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test_minimal_env.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_skill_junction_windows.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_skill_junction_windows.py:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "site-development" subprocess.run( ["cmd", "/c", "mklink", "/J", str(link), str(old_target)], che
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_skill_junction_windows.py
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
har_stopnetwork egressnetwork_unrouteingests untrusted inputpage_fetchingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egressbrowser_sessionno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclose_chromeno sensitive capabilityclose_storeno sensitive capabilityconnect_chromeno sensitive capabilityconsoleno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
dragno sensitive capabilityemulateno sensitive capabilityevaluate_scriptno sensitive capabilityfillno sensitive capabilityhandle_dialogno sensitive capabilityhar_startno sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilitylaunch_chromeno sensitive capabilitylist_chromeno sensitive capabilitylist_storesno sensitive capabilitynavigate_pageno sensitive capabilitynetworkno sensitive capabilitynetwork_routeno sensitive capabilitynetwork_routesno sensitive capabilityopen_storeno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrecorderno sensitive capabilitystart_clientno sensitive capabilitystop_clientno sensitive capabilityswitch_frameno sensitive capabilitytabno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytake_snapshotno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.80 latest |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.2.79 |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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