Zibdie Ssh MCP Server
@zibdie/ssh-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.10
Source verified
Published by zibdie — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Cross-platform MCP server for SSH connections with comprehensive remote server management tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ssh_download_file → ssh_list_files → ssh_execute. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow ssh_download_file → ssh_list_files → ssh_execute
high Tool "ssh_execute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_execute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_execute
high Tool "ssh_execute_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_execute_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_execute_script
high Tool "ssh_upload_and_execute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_upload_and_execute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_upload_and_execute
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:859`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -install')) { import('child_process').then(({ execFileSync }) => { const isWindows = process.platform === 'win32';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "ssh_execute"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_execute" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_execute · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "ssh_execute_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_execute_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_execute_script · inputSchema.properties.script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "ssh_upload_and_execute"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_upload_and_execute" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_upload_and_execute · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "ssh_execute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_execute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_execute
low Mutating tool "ssh_execute_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_execute_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_execute_script
low Mutating tool "ssh_upload_and_execute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_upload_and_execute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_upload_and_execute
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ssh_download_fileingests untrusted inputssh_executeruns code / shellssh_execute_scriptruns code / shellssh_list_filesreads sensitive datassh_upload_and_executeruns code / shellssh_upload_filenetwork egressssh_connectno sensitive capabilityssh_disconnectno sensitive capabilityssh_list_connectionsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.10 latest |
A 90/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @zibdie/ssh-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Zibdie Ssh 26
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