Zerno MCP Server
zerno-mcp
npm
v0.1.5
Published by zernozerno — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; import { existsSync, mkdi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
zerno_align_backlogno sensitive capabilityzerno_bulk_score_backlogno sensitive capabilityzerno_checkpointno sensitive capabilityzerno_create_agent_intake_taskno sensitive capabilityzerno_get_agent_settingsno sensitive capabilityzerno_get_backlog_healthno sensitive capabilityzerno_get_execution_policyno sensitive capabilityzerno_get_project_contextno sensitive capabilityzerno_get_runtime_configno sensitive capabilityzerno_get_stageno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
zerno_get_taskno sensitive capabilityzerno_list_ready_tasksno sensitive capabilityzerno_list_tasksno sensitive capabilityzerno_log_task_eventno sensitive capabilityzerno_memory_capture_noteno sensitive capabilityzerno_memory_list_betsno sensitive capabilityzerno_memory_list_constraintsno sensitive capabilityzerno_memory_list_decisionsno sensitive capabilityzerno_memory_list_notesno sensitive capabilityzerno_memory_searchno sensitive capabilityzerno_memory_snapshotno sensitive capabilityzerno_merge_tasksno sensitive capabilityzerno_product_healthno sensitive capabilityzerno_resume_taskno sensitive capabilityzerno_run_finishno sensitive capabilityzerno_run_record_usageno sensitive capabilityzerno_run_startno sensitive capabilityzerno_strategy_briefno sensitive capabilityzerno_submit_task_triageno sensitive capabilityzerno_update_taskno sensitive capabilityzerno_update_task_statusno sensitive capabilityzerno_upload_planno sensitive capabilityzerno_upload_reportno sensitive capabilityzerno_weekly_reviewno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.5 latest |
A 99/100 | 1 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan zerno-mcp --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Security scan results for the 1stay MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adguard Home MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ado Browser MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adobe Experience Dev MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aemet MCP server.
Security scan results for the Affinity Mcp Bridge MCP server.