Zeph To MCP Server
@zeph-to/mcp-server
npm
v2.3.1
Published by @zeph-to — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Zeph MCP server — AI agent notifications, prompts, and input via MCP protocol
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 37.8 = 62. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −31.5 | Compound tool-poisoning pattern MTC-INJ-POISON | injection |
| −6.3 | Concealment directive aimed at the assistant MTC-INJ-SEM-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 62 − 7 = 55. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Grade capped: a critical finding is present → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Compound tool-poisoning patternMTC-INJ-POISON
Multiple tool-poisoning signals co-occur in a single field (secrecy, exfil-param), including a concealment / override / sensitive-target directive. Together they form an instruction aimed at the model — the canonical tool-poisoning shape, not ordinary documentation.
Evidence: Ask the user a question with quick-reply buttons and a text input field. Combines prompt (buttons) and input (text) in a single notification. The user can either tap a button or type a response. `acti
Fix: Do not install this server; the metadata is engineered to manipulate the assistant.
Location: tool zeph_ask · description
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire("crypto"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path_1 = require("path"); const DEFAULT_BASE_U
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config.js
medium Concealment directive aimed at the assistant (language-agnostic)MTC-INJ-SEM-1
The description of tool "zeph_ask" combines a negation or stealth marker with a disclosure verb and a reference to the user — "keep this from the person" expressed as a shape rather than a fixed phrase, so it is detected regardless of wording or language. Metadata that tells the assistant what to withhold from its operator is not documentation.
Evidence: ike zeph notify and zeph file this tool is never end to
Fix: Tool metadata must not instruct the assistant to withhold anything from the user. Describe what the tool does; leave disclosure to the client.
Location: tool zeph_ask · description
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
zeph_inputnetwork egresszeph_askno sensitive capabilityzeph_broadcastno sensitive capabilityzeph_clipboardno sensitive capabilityzeph_dismissno sensitive capabilityzeph_dismiss_allno sensitive capabilityzeph_fileno sensitive capabilityzeph_listno sensitive capabilityzeph_notifyno sensitive capabilityzeph_promptno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
zeph_session_renameno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.1 latest |
F 55/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.3.0 |
F 55/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v2.2.0 |
F 55/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v2.1.0 |
F 55/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v2.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v1.16.0 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v1.15.2 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v1.15.1 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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