Zenrows MCP Server
@zenrows/mcp
npm
v2.2.0
Source verified
Published by zenrows — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
ZenRows MCP server — Universal Scraper API for AI coding assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "browser_evaluate" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "browser_evaluate" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool browser_evaluate
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([scrape, batch_create, batch_results, extract]) co-exist with external-action tools ([browser_evaluate]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [scrape, batch_create, batch_results, extract] → sinks [browser_evaluate]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow scrape → browser_evaluate
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "extract"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "extract" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool extract · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "browser_evaluate"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "browser_evaluate" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool browser_evaluate · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "browser_evaluate" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "browser_evaluate" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool browser_evaluate
Tools 43
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_createingests untrusted inputbatch_resultsingests untrusted inputbrowser_evaluateruns code / shellextractingests untrusted inputscrapeingests untrusted inputbatch_cancelno sensitive capabilitybatch_statusno sensitive capabilitybatch_waitno sensitive capabilitybrowser_batchno sensitive capabilitybrowser_checkno sensitive capability
Show 33 more tools ↓
browser_clear_cookiesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_closeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_dragno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fillno sensitive capabilitybrowser_focusno sensitive capabilitybrowser_generate_pdfno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_accessibility_treeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_attributeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_cookiesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_htmlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_titleno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_urlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_go_backno sensitive capabilitybrowser_go_forwardno sensitive capabilitybrowser_hoverno sensitive capabilitybrowser_local_storageno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_new_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_press_keyno sensitive capabilitybrowser_query_selector_allno sensitive capabilitybrowser_reloadno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_scrollno sensitive capabilitybrowser_select_optionno sensitive capabilitybrowser_set_cookiesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_switch_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_typeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_uncheckno sensitive capabilitybrowser_waitno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_navigationno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_selectorno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (43 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.1.2 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v2.0.6 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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