Pterodactyl (zefarie) MCP Server
@zefarie/pterodactyl-mcp
npm
v0.1.0
Published by @zefarie — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that exposes Pterodactyl Panel API to LLMs via the Model Context Protocol
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
medium Tool "delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_files
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "delete_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_files
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
Tools 73
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filesreads sensitive datawrites filesdownload_fileingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datalist_filesingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datawrite_filereads sensitive datawrites filescreate_folderreads sensitive datadecompress_filereads sensitive datadownload_backupingests untrusted inputlist_serversreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive datarename_filereads sensitive data
Show 63 more tools ↓
compress_filesno sensitive capabilitycreate_allocationno sensitive capabilitycreate_backupno sensitive capabilitycreate_databaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_egg_variableno sensitive capabilitycreate_scheduleno sensitive capabilitycreate_schedule_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_serverno sensitive capabilitycreate_subuserno sensitive capabilitycreate_userno sensitive capabilitydelete_allocationno sensitive capabilitydelete_backupno sensitive capabilitydelete_databaseno sensitive capabilitydelete_eggno sensitive capabilitydelete_egg_variableno sensitive capabilitydelete_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_schedule_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_serverno sensitive capabilitydelete_subuserno sensitive capabilityexport_eggno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_eggno sensitive capabilityget_nestno sensitive capabilityget_nodeno sensitive capabilityget_node_configno sensitive capabilityget_recent_logsno sensitive capabilityget_scheduleno sensitive capabilityget_serverno sensitive capabilityget_server_activityno sensitive capabilityget_server_resourcesno sensitive capabilityget_startup_variablesno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilityimport_eggno sensitive capabilitykill_serverno sensitive capabilitylist_allocationsno sensitive capabilitylist_backupsno sensitive capabilitylist_client_databasesno sensitive capabilitylist_egg_variablesno sensitive capabilitylist_eggsno sensitive capabilitylist_mountsno sensitive capabilitylist_nestsno sensitive capabilitylist_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_rolesno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_server_databasesno sensitive capabilitylist_subusersno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilityreinstall_serverno sensitive capabilityrestart_serverno sensitive capabilityrestore_backupno sensitive capabilityrotate_database_passwordno sensitive capabilitysend_commandno sensitive capabilitystart_serverno sensitive capabilitystop_serverno sensitive capabilitysuspend_serverno sensitive capabilityunsuspend_serverno sensitive capabilityupdate_egg_variableno sensitive capabilityupdate_scheduleno sensitive capabilityupdate_server_buildno sensitive capabilityupdate_server_detailsno sensitive capabilityupdate_server_startupno sensitive capabilityupdate_subuserno sensitive capabilityupdate_userno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (73 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @zefarie/pterodactyl-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Pterodactyl 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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