Zeek — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "zeek-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "zeek-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "zeek-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-3VUI4GIZ.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-3VUI4GIZ.js:2744`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-3VUI4GIZ.js"
},
"evidence": "rom \"path\"; import * as child_process from \"child_process\"; function getPcapConfig() { return { pcapDir: process.e",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-3VUI4GIZ.js",
"line": 2744,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "zeek_detect_anomalies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_network_baseline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_detect_outliers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_detect_beaconing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_connection_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_long_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_dhcp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_dhcp_asset_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_dns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_dns_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_dns_tunneling_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_executable_downloads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_http",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_suspicious_http",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_investigate_host",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_investigate_uid",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_ja3_fingerprints",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_ja3_hunt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_search_iocs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_bulk_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_add_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_notices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pcap_analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suricata_query_alerts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suricata_alert_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suricata_correlate_zeek",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suricata_eve_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "nids_sensor_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_software_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_ssh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_ssh_bruteforce",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_query_ssl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "zeek_expired_certs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "thehive_create_alert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "thehive_create_case",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "thehive_search_cases",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bcae074411215deb8b4111d6cb29a06e01499648de11e978a702807dc19cf6c5",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}