Zebbern Kali MCP Server
zebbern-kali-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.17
Published by zebbern — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Kali Linux security tools — connects AI agents to 145+ pentest tools via Docker
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 27
high Tool "zebbern_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "zebbern_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool zebbern_exec
high Tool "exec_stream" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_stream" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_stream
high Tool "reverse_shell_listener_start" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_listener_start" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_listener_start
high Tool "reverse_shell_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_command
high Tool "reverse_shell_send_payload" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_send_payload" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_send_payload
high Tool "reverse_shell_status" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_status" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_status
high Tool "reverse_shell_stop" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_stop" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_stop
high Tool "reverse_shell_upload_content" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_upload_content" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_upload_content
high Tool "reverse_shell_download_content" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_download_content" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_download_content
high Tool "reverse_shell_generate_payload" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "reverse_shell_generate_payload" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool reverse_shell_generate_payload
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([ctf_download_file, ctf_scoreboard, kali_download, target_download_file, payload_host_start, reverse_shell_download_content, ssh_session_download_content]) co-exist with external-action tools ([zebbern_exec, exec_stream, target_upload_file, reverse_shell_listener_start, reverse_shell_command, reverse_shell_send_payload, reverse_shell_status, reverse_shell_stop, reverse_shell_upload_content, reverse_shell_download_content, reverse_shell_generate_payload]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [ctf_download_file, ctf_scoreboard, kali_download, target_download_file, payload_host_start, reverse_shell_download_content, ssh_session_download_cont
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow ctf_download_file → zebbern_exec
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_pivot_tunnel_wiring.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_pivot_tunnel_wiring.py:114`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort=80, key_file="/root/id_rsa", ) cmd = seen["cmd"] assert cmd[0] == "ssh" assert "-i"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_pivot_tunnel_wiring.py
low Mutating tool "zebbern_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "zebbern_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool zebbern_exec
low Mutating tool "exec_stream" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_stream" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_stream
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_listener_start" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_listener_start" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_listener_start
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_command
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_send_payload" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_send_payload" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_send_payload
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_status" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_status" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_status
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_stop" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_stop" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_stop
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_upload_content" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_upload_content" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_upload_content
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_download_content" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_download_content" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_download_content
low Mutating tool "reverse_shell_generate_payload" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "reverse_shell_generate_payload" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool reverse_shell_generate_payload
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_checkout_source.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_checkout_source.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ELPER) converted = subprocess.run( [ "wsl.exe", "--", "wslpath",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_checkout_source.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_deployment_config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_deployment_config.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: f", file)] result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "compose", *compose_files, "config", "--format", "json"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_deployment_config.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_job_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_job_manager.py:376`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t("sh -c 'sleep 30 &'", shell=True, timeout=5) wait_for_terminal(manager, job["job_id"]) deadline = tim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_job_manager.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_job_routes.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_job_routes.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ ) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", code], cwd=PROJECT_ROOT, capture_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_job_routes.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_reverse_shell_teardown.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_reverse_shell_teardown.py:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tener is spawned with ``shell=True`` under ``preexec_fn=os.setsid``, so the tracked process is the SHELL and the real ``
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_reverse_shell_teardown.py
Tools 133
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
reverse_shell_download_contentingests untrusted inputruns code / shellctf_download_fileingests untrusted inputctf_scoreboardingests untrusted inputexec_streamruns code / shellkali_downloadingests untrusted inputpayload_host_startingests untrusted inputreverse_shell_commandruns code / shellreverse_shell_generate_payloadruns code / shellreverse_shell_listener_startruns code / shellreverse_shell_send_payloadruns code / shell
Show 123 more tools ↓
reverse_shell_statusruns code / shellreverse_shell_stopruns code / shellreverse_shell_upload_contentruns code / shellssh_session_download_contentingests untrusted inputtarget_download_fileingests untrusted inputtarget_upload_filenetwork egresszebbern_execruns code / shellad_asreproastno sensitive capabilityad_bloodhound_collectno sensitive capabilityad_kerberoastno sensitive capabilityad_ldap_enumno sensitive capabilityad_password_sprayno sensitive capabilityad_psexecno sensitive capabilityad_secretsdumpno sensitive capabilityad_smb_enumno sensitive capabilityad_tools_statusno sensitive capabilityad_wmiexecno sensitive capabilityapi_auth_bypass_testno sensitive capabilityapi_ffuf_fuzzno sensitive capabilityapi_fuzz_endpointno sensitive capabilityapi_graphql_fuzzno sensitive capabilityapi_graphql_introspectno sensitive capabilityapi_jwt_analyzeno sensitive capabilityapi_jwt_crackno sensitive capabilityapi_kiterunner_scanno sensitive capabilityapi_newman_runno sensitive capabilityapi_nuclei_scanno sensitive capabilityapi_rate_limit_testno sensitive capabilitycallback_checkno sensitive capabilitycallback_clearno sensitive capabilitycallback_generateno sensitive capabilitycallback_latestno sensitive capabilitycallback_listno sensitive capabilitycallback_startno sensitive capabilitycallback_statusno sensitive capabilitycallback_stopno sensitive capabilitycallback_waitno sensitive capabilityctf_connectno sensitive capabilityctf_get_challengeno sensitive capabilityctf_list_challengesno sensitive capabilityctf_statusno sensitive capabilityctf_submit_flagno sensitive capabilitycve_package_auditno sensitive capabilitycve_searchno sensitive capabilityexploit_copyno sensitive capabilityexploit_detailsno sensitive capabilityexploit_searchno sensitive capabilityexploit_suggest_for_serviceno sensitive capabilityexploit_suggest_from_nmapno sensitive capabilityfingerprint_headersno sensitive capabilityfingerprint_urlno sensitive capabilityfingerprint_wafno sensitive capabilityhealthno sensitive capabilityhosts_addno sensitive capabilityhosts_clearno sensitive capabilityhosts_listno sensitive capabilityhosts_removeno sensitive capabilityjob_cancelno sensitive capabilityjob_listno sensitive capabilityjob_outputno sensitive capabilityjob_statusno sensitive capabilitykali_uploadno sensitive capabilitymsf_session_createno sensitive capabilitymsf_session_destroyno sensitive capabilitymsf_session_destroy_allno sensitive capabilitymsf_session_executeno sensitive capabilitymsf_session_listno sensitive capabilityparse_tool_outputno sensitive capabilitypayload_generateno sensitive capabilitypayload_host_stopno sensitive capabilitypayload_listno sensitive capabilitypayload_one_linerno sensitive capabilitypayload_templatesno sensitive capabilitypivot_add_pivotno sensitive capabilitypivot_chisel_clientno sensitive capabilitypivot_chisel_serverno sensitive capabilitypivot_generate_proxychainsno sensitive capabilitypivot_ligolo_startno sensitive capabilitypivot_list_pivotsno sensitive capabilitypivot_list_tunnelsno sensitive capabilitypivot_removeno sensitive capabilitypivot_socat_forwardno sensitive capabilitypivot_ssh_dynamicno sensitive capabilitypivot_ssh_localno sensitive capabilitypivot_ssh_remoteno sensitive capabilitypivot_stop_all_tunnelsno sensitive capabilitypivot_stop_tunnelno sensitive capabilityread_outputno sensitive capabilitysend_inputno sensitive capabilityssh_estimate_transferno sensitive capabilityssh_session_commandno sensitive capabilityssh_session_startno sensitive capabilityssh_session_statusno sensitive capabilityssh_session_stopno sensitive capabilityssh_session_upload_contentno sensitive capabilityssh_sessionsno sensitive capabilitysystem_network_infono sensitive capabilitytools_amassno sensitive capabilitytools_arjunno sensitive capabilitytools_assetfinderno sensitive capabilitytools_byp4xxno sensitive capabilitytools_crtshno sensitive capabilitytools_enum4linuxno sensitive capabilitytools_fierceno sensitive capabilitytools_gobusterno sensitive capabilitytools_gowitnessno sensitive capabilitytools_httpxno sensitive capabilitytools_hydrano sensitive capabilitytools_johnno sensitive capabilitytools_katanano sensitive capabilitytools_masscanno sensitive capabilitytools_niktono sensitive capabilitytools_nmapno sensitive capabilitytools_sqlmapno sensitive capabilitytools_ssh_auditno sensitive capabilitytools_sslscanno sensitive capabilitytools_subfinderno sensitive capabilitytools_subzyno sensitive capabilitytools_waybackurlsno sensitive capabilitytools_wpscanno sensitive capabilityvpn_connectno sensitive capabilityvpn_disconnectno sensitive capabilityvpn_statusno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (133 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.17 latest |
A 93/100 | 27 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.0.15 |
A 93/100 | 27 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 25 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v1.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 23 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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