Zandronum MCP Server
zandronum-mcp
npm
v0.6.0
Source verified
Published by rc4l — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for driving and introspecting a local Zandronum dev build.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "run_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_command
high Tool "run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name, parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/process/launch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/process/launch.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; /** * Accept `ZANDRONUM_EXE` pointing
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/process/launch.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/process/reap.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/process/reap.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; /** Parse `ps -o ppid= -p <pid>` output into a PID. */ export function parsePpid
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/process/reap.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/process/registry.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/process/registry.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nodeSpawn } from "node:child_process"; import { BridgeClient } from "../bridge/transport.js"; import { buildLaunchArgs,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/process/registry.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "run_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_script · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "run_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_command
low Mutating tool "run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_script
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
run_commandruns code / shellrun_scriptruns code / shellacs_indexno sensitive capabilityactor_stateno sensitive capabilityactors_nearno sensitive capabilityattach_instanceno sensitive capabilitybehavior_namesno sensitive capabilityfind_acs_symbolno sensitive capabilityfind_sectors_by_tagno sensitive capabilityget_acs_varno sensitive capability
Show 45 more tools ↓
get_crashno sensitive capabilityget_linedefno sensitive capabilityget_map_arrayno sensitive capabilityget_map_varno sensitive capabilityget_sectorno sensitive capabilityget_startup_errorsno sensitive capabilitygiveno sensitive capabilityhud_infono sensitive capabilityinspect_targetno sensitive capabilitykill_instanceno sensitive capabilitylaunch_instanceno sensitive capabilitylist_acs_varsno sensitive capabilitylist_actor_classesno sensitive capabilitylist_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_modulesno sensitive capabilitylist_running_scriptsno sensitive capabilitylist_savesno sensitive capabilitylist_scriptsno sensitive capabilityload_gameno sensitive capabilityload_mapno sensitive capabilitymap_infono sensitive capabilitymenu_keyno sensitive capabilitymenu_navno sensitive capabilitymenu_textno sensitive capabilitymouse_clickno sensitive capabilitymouse_moveno sensitive capabilitymouse_wheelno sensitive capabilityplay_demono sensitive capabilityplayer_stateno sensitive capabilityprofile_scriptsno sensitive capabilityprofile_windowno sensitive capabilityread_hudno sensitive capabilityrenderer_infono sensitive capabilityresetno sensitive capabilitysave_gameno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityset_acs_varno sensitive capabilityset_map_arrayno sensitive capabilityset_map_varno sensitive capabilityset_pauseno sensitive capabilitystepno sensitive capabilitysummonno sensitive capabilitytakeno sensitive capabilityverify_menuno sensitive capabilityviewport_infono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v0.5.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.4.3 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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