Harmony (yujiamei) MCP Server
@yujiamei/harmony-mcp
npm
v0.5.0
Published by @yujiamei — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
中国本土化开发者工具 MCP Server —— 微信小程序、鸿蒙设备自动化
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([wechat_diagnose]) and tools that can send data out ([wechat_open_project, wechat_init_project]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [wechat_diagnose] → sinks [wechat_open_project, wechat_init_project]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow wechat_diagnose → wechat_open_project
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/harmony/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/harmony/cli.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { detectHdcPath } from "../../utils/pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/harmony/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/wechat/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/wechat/cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { detectWechatCliPath, isWechatToolRunn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/wechat/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/process.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/process.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { join } from "path"; import { homedir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/process.js
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
wechat_diagnosereads sensitive datawechat_init_projectnetwork egresswechat_open_projectnetwork egressharmony_file_pullno sensitive capabilityharmony_file_pushno sensitive capabilityharmony_installno sensitive capabilityharmony_list_devicesno sensitive capabilityharmony_logno sensitive capabilityharmony_ready_checkno sensitive capabilityharmony_startno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
harmony_uninstallno sensitive capabilitywechat_auditno sensitive capabilitywechat_auto_previewno sensitive capabilitywechat_automation_startno sensitive capabilitywechat_build_npmno sensitive capabilitywechat_cache_cleanno sensitive capabilitywechat_ci_build_npmno sensitive capabilitywechat_ci_previewno sensitive capabilitywechat_ci_ready_checkno sensitive capabilitywechat_ci_sourcemapno sensitive capabilitywechat_cli_loginno sensitive capabilitywechat_close_projectno sensitive capabilitywechat_compliance_checkno sensitive capabilitywechat_config_validateno sensitive capabilitywechat_dependency_checkno sensitive capabilitywechat_package_sizeno sensitive capabilitywechat_page_listno sensitive capabilitywechat_previewno sensitive capabilitywechat_project_infono sensitive capabilitywechat_publishno sensitive capabilitywechat_ready_checkno sensitive capabilitywechat_reset_fileutilsno sensitive capabilitywechat_runtime_diagnoseno sensitive capabilitywechat_self_testno sensitive capabilitywechat_subpackage_suggestno sensitive capabilitywechat_uploadno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @yujiamei/harmony-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Harmony 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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