Exchange Skill — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "@yubit/exchange-skill",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@yubit/exchange-skill"
},
"server": {
"name": "@yubit/exchange-skill"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/cli.js",
"line": 6
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lib/setup/clients.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/setup/clients.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/setup/clients.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lib/setup/clients.js",
"line": 6
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lib/setup/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/setup/doctor.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/setup/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lib/setup/doctor.js",
"line": 3
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (lib/setup/clients.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/setup/clients.js:25`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/setup/clients.js"
},
"evidence": "execSync(`which ${",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "lib/setup/clients.js",
"line": 25
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "getTicker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getOrderbook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getKlines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getMarkPriceKlines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getFundingRate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getInstruments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getRiskLimits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getRecentTrades",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getFundingRateHistory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetBalance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetPositions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetFeeRate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetModeConfigs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetOpenOrders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetOrderHistory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetExecutions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetClosedPnl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpGetWalletFlowRecords",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spotGetBalance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tradfiGetBalance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "earnGetBalance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fundGetAssets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getPortfolioNetWorth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpCreateOrder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpAddToPosition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpModifyOrder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpCancelOrder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpCancelAllOrders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpSetLeverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpCreateTpSl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpReplaceTpSl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpSwitchPositionMode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpSwitchMarginMode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpAddMargin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "perpClosePosition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "transfer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getCapabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getTrace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "searchTraces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "10d66d5f50cf5b53757f07e52d85a3b5368bcb6f6ac7f38f5d52e9834cb461f8",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}