Filesystem (yinzhouzhi) MCP Server
@yinzhouzhi/mcp-filesystem-server
npm
v1.0.7
Published by @yinzhouzhi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local filesystem operations server over stdio supporting file and directory operations.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:139`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn } = require(\'child_process\');'); console.log('const { McpClient } = require(\'@modelcontextprotocol/s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
medium Tool "append_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "append_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "append_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool append_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/config/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/config/index.js:28`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { userConfig = require(configPath); console.log(`已加载用户配置: ${configPath}`); } catch (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/config/index.js
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "append_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "append_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool append_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
append_filewrites filesdelete_filewrites fileslist_filesreads sensitive datamove_filewrites filesread_filereads sensitive dataread_file_linesreads sensitive datawrite_filewrites filesclear_cacheno sensitive capabilityclose_all_watchersno sensitive capabilitycopy_fileno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
count_file_linesno sensitive capabilitycreate_directoryno sensitive capabilitydelete_directoryno sensitive capabilitydirectory_existsno sensitive capabilitydirectory_infono sensitive capabilityfile_existsno sensitive capabilityget_cache_statsno sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_monitor_pool_statusno sensitive capabilityget_server_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_watchersno sensitive capabilityread_excel_fileno sensitive capabilityread_word_documentno sensitive capabilitysearch_file_contentno sensitive capabilityset_dir_change_callbackno sensitive capabilityset_file_cache_configno sensitive capabilityset_file_change_callbackno sensitive capabilitystop_watchno sensitive capabilitywatch_pathno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @yinzhouzhi/mcp-filesystem-server --onlineOther implementations of Filesystem 22
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