yii2-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.2
Published by artmin96 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for Yii2 Framework - Database schema inspection, command execution, and project management
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tool "yii_command_help" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool yii_command_help
Tool "yii_execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool yii_execute_command
In the server's implementation (`dist/yii2.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/yii2.js
Tool "yii_command_help" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool yii_command_help · inputSchema.properties.command
Tool "yii_execute_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool yii_execute_command · inputSchema.properties.command
Tool "yii_command_help" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool yii_command_help
Tool "yii_execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool yii_execute_command
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
yii_command_helpruns code / shellyii_execute_commandruns code / shellasset_analyze_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityasset_list_bundlesno sensitive capabilityasset_performance_analysisno sensitive capabilitycache_clearno sensitive capabilitycache_inspectno sensitive capabilitycache_performanceno sensitive capabilityconfig_inspectno sensitive capabilitydb_connection_monitorno sensitive capabilitydb_describe_tableno sensitive capabilitydb_execute_queryno sensitive capabilitydb_index_suggestionsno sensitive capabilitydb_list_tablesno sensitive capabilitydb_query_profilerno sensitive capabilitydb_table_analysisno sensitive capabilitydb_table_relationshipsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_apino sensitive capabilitygenerate_crudno sensitive capabilitygenerate_formno sensitive capabilitygenerate_modelno sensitive capabilitylog_error_analysisno sensitive capabilitylog_performance_issuesno sensitive capabilitylog_searchno sensitive capabilitylog_tailno sensitive capabilitymigration_createno sensitive capabilitymigration_diffno sensitive capabilitymigration_generate_from_modelno sensitive capabilitymigration_rollbackno sensitive capabilitymodule_detailed_analysisno sensitive capabilitymodule_infono sensitive capabilityperformance_profileno sensitive capabilityproject_structureno sensitive capabilityqueue_clear_failedno sensitive capabilityqueue_job_statusno sensitive capabilityqueue_retry_failedno sensitive capabilityqueue_worker_statusno sensitive capabilityrbac_access_debugno sensitive capabilityrbac_permission_treeno sensitive capabilityrbac_role_analysisno sensitive capabilityrbac_user_accessno sensitive capabilitytest_coverage_reportno sensitive capabilitytest_generateno sensitive capabilitytest_runno sensitive capabilitywidget_listno sensitive capabilityyii_analyze_modelno sensitive capabilityyii_list_commandsno sensitive capabilityyii_list_migrationsno sensitive capabilityyii_list_modelsno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan yii2-mcp-server --online
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