Yawlabs MCP Server
@yawlabs/mcp
npm
v0.80.0
Published by @yawlabs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Yaw MCP -- MCP servers, managed. Free to run locally; Yaw Team adds cross-machine sync.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js:939`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: es = [join2(homedir3(), ".npmrc")]; for (const nodeModules of ownNodeModules(fromUrl)) { candidates.push( jo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn as spawn3 } from "child_process"; import { createHash } from "crypto"; import { closeSync, openSync, readFil
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { readFile } from "fs/promises"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js:1375`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://registry.npmjs.org/@yawlabs/mcp/latest", { signal: ac.signal, headers
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-EXO2NR5I.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5356`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${pkg}/latest`, { signal: ac.signal, headers: { ac
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@yawlabs/mcp" executes preinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "const major=Number(process.versions.node.split('.')[0]);if(major<20){console.error('@yawlabs/mcp requires Node 20 or newer; this is Node '+process.vers
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @yawlabs/mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.80.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.79.2 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.78.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.76.2 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.76.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.76.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.75.4 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v0.75.2 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.75.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v0.74.3 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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