Yandex Messenger MCP Server
yandex-messenger-mcp
npm
v0.4.0
Source verified
Published by conarti — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Yandex Messenger (cookie/xiva transport)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_attachment] → sinks [send_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_attachment → send_message
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_attachmentingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egressdelete_messageno sensitive capabilityedit_messageno sensitive capabilityget_historyno sensitive capabilityget_messageno sensitive capabilityget_message_contextno sensitive capabilityget_pollno sensitive capabilityget_threadno sensitive capabilityjoin_to_threadno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
leave_threadno sensitive capabilitylist_chatsno sensitive capabilitylist_reactionsno sensitive capabilitymark_readno sensitive capabilitypin_messageno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysend_fileno sensitive capabilityset_reactionno sensitive capabilityvote_in_pollno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 97/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.2.0 |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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