Vibeguard (yagyeshvyas) MCP Server
@yagyeshvyas/vibeguard
npm
v1.3.0
Published by @yagyeshvyas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Security scanner + AI agent firewall. Blocks secret/PII exfiltration in real time. 752 rules, 82 MCP tools (agent-scan, mcp-audit, guard-action, generate-sbom, dep-reachability, license-compliance), AST taint analysis. Offline, zero telemetry, zero depend
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 12.5 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.8 | Shell command embedded in tool metadata ×2 MTC-INJ-CMD-1 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 7 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 42
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([config_dump]) and tools that can send data out ([guard_action, check_command, slack_notify, agent_guard, sandbox_exec]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [config_dump] → sinks [guard_action, check_command, slack_notify, agent_guard, sandbox_exec]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow config_dump → guard_action
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/interceptor.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/interceptor.js:44`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ssh', '.aws', '.gnupg', '.npmrc', '.gitconfig'], // Block commands matching these patterns blockCommands: ['rm -rf',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/interceptor.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/rules-pack.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/rules-pack.js:1173`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rnal packages; configure .npmrc scopes correctly.', owasp: 'A08:2025 Software and Data Integrity Failures', cwe:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/rules-pack.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/rules.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/rules.js:225`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s token (also flagged in .npmrc).', fix: 'Remove it, use an environment variable / CI secret, and revoke it on npmj
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/rules.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/scanner.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/scanner.js:74`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , '.env.production', '.npmrc', 'Dockerfile', '.dockerenv', ]); const MAX_FILE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024; // 2MB — s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scanner.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/slopsquat.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/slopsquat.js:133`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: . If internal, configure .npmrc scopes. If from an AI suggestion, remove it.`, owasp: 'A08:2025 Software and D
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/slopsquat.js
high Tool "guard_action" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "guard_action" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool guard_action
high Tool "check_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "check_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool check_command
high Tool "agent_guard" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "agent_guard" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool agent_guard
high Tool "sandbox_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "sandbox_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec
high Dynamic code execution in server code (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:1194`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: variables - Never use eval() or new Function() with user input - Never concatenate SQL strings — use parameterized qu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ast.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/ast.js:149`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecution.', fix: 'Remove eval(). Use JSON.parse or an explicit dispatch table.', snippet: 'eval(...)' }); } i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ast.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/policy-gen.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/policy-gen.js:283`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'unsafe-eval' — remove eval() usage" : null, ].filter(Boolean), }; } module.exports = { generatePrivacyPolicy, g
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/policy-gen.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/rules-pack.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/rules-pack.js:750`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cy allows unsafe-eval — eval() and new Function() can be used for XSS.', fix: 'Remove unsafe-eval; refactor any code
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/rules-pack.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/rules.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/rules.js:334`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ipInString: true, // an eval() inside a quoted string is text, not a call message: 'eval() executes arbitrary code
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/rules.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/secure-prompt.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/secure-prompt.js:24`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , msg: 'Prompt requests eval() — code injection risk' }, { re: /new\s+Function\s*\(/i, risk: 'high', msg: 'Prompt requ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/secure-prompt.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/taint-ast.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/taint-ast.js:90`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: le: 'User input reaches eval()/Function() (dataflow-confirmed)', message: 'A value derived from user input flows int
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/taint-ast.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/taint.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/taint.js:53`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: le: 'User input reaches eval()/Function() (dataflow-confirmed)', message: 'A value derived from user input flows int
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/taint.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:1207`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ever pass user input to exec() or spawn() without sanitization - For AI agents: add maxSteps, sandbox file access, allo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/auto.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/auto.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require('child_process'); const STATE_DIR = '.vibeguard'; const STATE_FILE = path.join(STATE_DIR, 'auto.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/auto.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/daemon.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require('child_process'); const DAEMON_FILE = '.vibeguard-daemon.json'; const DAEMON_LOG = '.vibeguard-d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/deps.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/deps.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require('child_process'); const AUDIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 60000; // npm severity -> VibeGuard severity. npm us
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/deps.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/engine.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/engine.js:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e: /exec\s*\(/g, name: 'exec()', type: 'code' }, { re: /open\s*\(/g, name: 'open()', type: 'file' }, { re: /pickle
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/engine.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/external.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/external.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require('child_process'); const isWin = process.platform === 'win32'; const TIMEOUT_MS = 180000; functi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/external.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/guard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/guard.js:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const { checkCommand } = require('./shell-guard'); const originalExecSync =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/guard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/history.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/history.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const { secretRules, matchAll } = require('./rules'); const isWin = process.pl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/history.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/interceptor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/interceptor.js:280`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ile, spawn } = require('child_process'); if (exec) { interceptors.exec = exec; require('child_process').exec =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/interceptor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp-server.js:516`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: process.env, no fs, no child_process, no network. Time-limited and memory-limited. Full audit log of every operation at
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp-server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/daemon.js:117`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const gitResult = execSync(`git show HEAD:"${relPath}" 2>NUL`, { cwd: rootDir,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/daemon.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp-server.js:889`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s; try { diffFiles = execSync(`git diff ${base} --name-only`, { cwd: dir, encoding: 'utf8' }).trim().split('\n').filt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp-server.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "guard_action"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "guard_action" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool guard_action · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "check_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "check_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool check_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "agent_guard"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "agent_guard" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool agent_guard · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "sandbox_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "sandbox_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool sandbox_exec · inputSchema.properties.code
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/plugin.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/plugin.js:80`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { mod = require(name); } catch { // Try resolving from the root directory co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/plugin.js
low Mutating tool "guard_action" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "guard_action" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool guard_action
low Mutating tool "check_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "check_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool check_command
low Mutating tool "agent_guard" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "agent_guard" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool agent_guard
low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "sandbox_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec
low Shell command embedded in tool metadataMTC-INJ-CMD-1
Shell command embedded in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "check_command". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: rm -rf
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool check_command · description
low Shell command embedded in tool metadataMTC-INJ-CMD-1
Shell command embedded in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "agent_guard". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: rm -rf
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool agent_guard · description
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@yagyeshvyas/vibeguard" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @yagyeshvyas/vibeguard
Tools 82
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
agent_guardruns code / shellcheck_commandruns code / shellconfig_dumpreads sensitive dataguard_actionruns code / shellsandbox_execruns code / shellslack_notifynetwork egressagent_scanno sensitive capabilityai_data_guardno sensitive capabilityai_firewallno sensitive capabilityanalyze_cross_file_dataflowno sensitive capability
Show 72 more tools ↓
analyze_dataflowno sensitive capabilityaudit_configno sensitive capabilityaudit_logno sensitive capabilityauth_coverageno sensitive capabilitybaselineno sensitive capabilitybatch_fixno sensitive capabilitybehavior_analysisno sensitive capabilitycheck_codeno sensitive capabilitycheck_package_healthno sensitive capabilitycompliance_reportno sensitive capabilitycve_intelno sensitive capabilitydeep_scanno sensitive capabilitydep_firewallno sensitive capabilitydep_reachabilityno sensitive capabilitydependency_treeno sensitive capabilitydetect_piino sensitive capabilityenv_lockno sensitive capabilityexfil_checkno sensitive capabilityexplain_remediationno sensitive capabilityexport_sarifno sensitive capabilityfix_codeno sensitive capabilityfull_auditno sensitive capabilitygenerate_cspno sensitive capabilitygenerate_html_reportno sensitive capabilitygenerate_policyno sensitive capabilitygenerate_privacy_policyno sensitive capabilitygenerate_sbomno sensitive capabilityguardvibe_doctorno sensitive capabilityignore_ruleno sensitive capabilityinteractive_dashboardno sensitive capabilitylicense_complianceno sensitive capabilitylist_rulesno sensitive capabilitymcp_auditno sensitive capabilitynetwork_auditno sensitive capabilityoutput_guardno sensitive capabilitypr_commentno sensitive capabilitypre_deployno sensitive capabilitypreset_applyno sensitive capabilityprivacy_auditno sensitive capabilityredact_piino sensitive capabilityremediation_planno sensitive capabilityrepo_security_postureno sensitive capabilityreview_hotspotsno sensitive capabilityreview_prno sensitive capabilityrisk_scoreno sensitive capabilityrule_infono sensitive capabilityscan_changed_filesno sensitive capabilityscan_config_changeno sensitive capabilityscan_container_imageno sensitive capabilityscan_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityscan_fileno sensitive capabilityscan_hallucinated_packagesno sensitive capabilityscan_projectno sensitive capabilityscan_secretsno sensitive capabilityscan_secrets_historyno sensitive capabilityscan_stagedno sensitive capabilityscan_urlno sensitive capabilitysecure_promptno sensitive capabilitysecure_thisno sensitive capabilitysecurity_scorecardno sensitive capabilitysecurity_statsno sensitive capabilityself_checkno sensitive capabilityseverity_matrixno sensitive capabilitysuggest_fixesno sensitive capabilitysupply_chain_auditno sensitive capabilitytamper_checkno sensitive capabilitythreat_modelno sensitive capabilitytrace_promptno sensitive capabilitytrend_reportno sensitive capabilityvault_manageno sensitive capabilityverify_fixesno sensitive capabilityverify_remediationno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (82 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
B 81/100 | 42 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
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