Ya Frida MCP Server
ya-frida-mcp
PyPI
v0.6.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Tool "adb_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "adb_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool adb_shell
high Tool "frida_enable_spawn_gating" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "frida_enable_spawn_gating" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool frida_enable_spawn_gating
high Tool "frida_disable_spawn_gating" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "frida_disable_spawn_gating" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool frida_disable_spawn_gating
high Tool "frida_enumerate_pending_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "frida_enumerate_pending_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool frida_enumerate_pending_spawn
high Tool "frida_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "frida_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool frida_spawn
high Shell/command execution in server code (ya_frida_mcp/core/base.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ya_frida_mcp/core/base.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: actmethod async def spawn(self, program: str, **kwargs: Any) -> int: ... @abstractmethod async def
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ya_frida_mcp/core/base.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (ya_frida_mcp/core/device.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ya_frida_mcp/core/device.py:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: *kwargs) async def spawn( self, program: str, *, argv: list[str] | None = None,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ya_frida_mcp/core/device.py
low Mutating tool "adb_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "adb_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool adb_shell
low Mutating tool "frida_enable_spawn_gating" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "frida_enable_spawn_gating" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool frida_enable_spawn_gating
low Mutating tool "frida_disable_spawn_gating" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "frida_disable_spawn_gating" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool frida_disable_spawn_gating
low Mutating tool "frida_enumerate_pending_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "frida_enumerate_pending_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool frida_enumerate_pending_spawn
low Mutating tool "frida_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "frida_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool frida_spawn
Tools 61
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
adb_shellruns code / shellfrida_disable_spawn_gatingruns code / shellfrida_enable_spawn_gatingruns code / shellfrida_enumerate_pending_spawnruns code / shellfrida_post_messagenetwork egressfrida_spawnruns code / shelladb_connectno sensitive capabilityadb_devicesno sensitive capabilityadb_disconnectno sensitive capabilityadb_forwardno sensitive capability
Show 51 more tools ↓
adb_forward_removeno sensitive capabilityadb_getpropno sensitive capabilityadb_installno sensitive capabilityadb_logcatno sensitive capabilityadb_pullno sensitive capabilityadb_pushno sensitive capabilityadb_rebootno sensitive capabilityadb_reverseno sensitive capabilityadb_reverse_removeno sensitive capabilityadb_rootno sensitive capabilityadb_uninstallno sensitive capabilityadb_unrootno sensitive capabilityfrida_add_remoteno sensitive capabilityfrida_attachno sensitive capabilityfrida_compile_scriptno sensitive capabilityfrida_detachno sensitive capabilityfrida_disable_child_gatingno sensitive capabilityfrida_enable_child_gatingno sensitive capabilityfrida_enumerate_exportsno sensitive capabilityfrida_enumerate_modulesno sensitive capabilityfrida_enumerate_pending_childrenno sensitive capabilityfrida_eternalize_scriptno sensitive capabilityfrida_fix_usapno sensitive capabilityfrida_get_deviceno sensitive capabilityfrida_get_frontmost_applicationno sensitive capabilityfrida_get_messagesno sensitive capabilityfrida_injectno sensitive capabilityfrida_inject_library_blobno sensitive capabilityfrida_inject_library_fileno sensitive capabilityfrida_killno sensitive capabilityfrida_list_exportsno sensitive capabilityfrida_list_scriptsno sensitive capabilityfrida_list_sessionsno sensitive capabilityfrida_ls_appsno sensitive capabilityfrida_ls_apps_runningno sensitive capabilityfrida_ls_devicesno sensitive capabilityfrida_memory_protectno sensitive capabilityfrida_memory_readno sensitive capabilityfrida_memory_scanno sensitive capabilityfrida_memory_writeno sensitive capabilityfrida_psno sensitive capabilityfrida_query_system_parametersno sensitive capabilityfrida_remove_remoteno sensitive capabilityfrida_resumeno sensitive capabilityfrida_rpc_callno sensitive capabilityfrida_server_installno sensitive capabilityfrida_server_startno sensitive capabilityfrida_server_statusno sensitive capabilityfrida_server_stopno sensitive capabilityfrida_snapshot_scriptno sensitive capabilityfrida_unload_scriptno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 12 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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