Agent Memory (xultrax-web) MCP Server
@xultrax-web/agent-memory-mcp
npm
v0.15.1
Published by @xultrax-web — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Codify how you work. Every AI tool obeys. Markdown rules + cross-tool companion files (AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md/.cursor/rules/.gemini) + Compliance Receipts for protocol-level enforcement of destructive ops. Reference implementation of CRP 1.0. Works on every
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 16 = 84. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −16 | Shell command embedded in tool metadata ×2 MTC-INJ-CMD-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 84 − 7 = 77. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell command embedded in tool metadataMTC-INJ-CMD-1
Shell command embedded in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "init". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: rm -rf
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool init · description
high Tool "no-curl-pipe-shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "no-curl-pipe-shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool no-curl-pipe-shell
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash, createHmac, createPrivateKey, createPublicKey, generateKeyP
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tui.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tui.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react"; import Fuse from "fuse.js"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tui.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_memory]) co-exist with external-action tools ([no-curl-pipe-shell]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_memory] → sinks [no-curl-pipe-shell]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_memory → no-curl-pipe-shell
low Mutating tool "no-curl-pipe-shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "no-curl-pipe-shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool no-curl-pipe-shell
low Shell command embedded in tool metadataMTC-INJ-CMD-1
Shell command embedded in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "no-rm-rf". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: rm -rf
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool no-rm-rf · description
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
no-curl-pipe-shellnetwork egressruns code / shellget_memoryingests untrusted inputauditno sensitive capabilityaudit_staleno sensitive capabilitycheck_actionno sensitive capabilitydelete_memoryno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilityemit_companionsno sensitive capabilityextract_memoriesno sensitive capabilityfind_backlinksno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
find_relatedno sensitive capabilityinitno sensitive capabilitylist_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_rulesno sensitive capabilitylog_eventsno sensitive capabilityMemory indexno sensitive capabilityno-prod-data-destructionno sensitive capabilityno-rm-rfno sensitive capabilityno-secrets-in-commitsno sensitive capabilityprepare_handoffno sensitive capabilityprojectno sensitive capabilityprotect-main-branchno sensitive capabilityrelevant_memoriesno sensitive capabilityrestore_memoryno sensitive capabilityrotate_keyno sensitive capabilitysave_memoryno sensitive capabilitysave_ruleno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoriesno sensitive capabilitystatsno sensitive capabilitysummarize_topicno sensitive capabilitysync_pullno sensitive capabilitysync_pushno sensitive capabilitysync_statusno sensitive capabilitytopicno sensitive capabilityvalidate_receiptno sensitive capabilityverify_memoryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.15.1 latest |
C 77/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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