Xpal — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "xpal",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "xpal"
},
"server": {
"name": "xpal"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([lookup_users, get_tweets]) co-exist with external-action tools ([quote_tweet, delete_tweet, get_tweet_reposters, create_poll_tweet, favorite_tweet, unfavorite_tweet, bookmark_tweet, delete_bookmark]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "lookup_users → quote_tweet"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [lookup_users, get_tweets] → sinks [quote_tweet, delete_tweet, get_tweet_reposters, create_poll_tweet, favorite_tweet, unfavorite_tweet, bookmark_twee",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"lookup_users",
"get_tweets"
],
"sinks": [
"quote_tweet",
"delete_tweet",
"get_tweet_reposters",
"create_poll_tweet",
"favorite_tweet",
"unfavorite_tweet",
"bookmark_tweet",
"delete_bookmark"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/xpal/client.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/xpal/client.py:216`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/xpal/client.py"
},
"evidence": "token}\"} resp = requests.get( \"https://api.x.com/2/users/me\", headers=headers,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/xpal/client.py",
"line": 216,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"xpal\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "xpal"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"lookup_users",
"get_tweets"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"quote_tweet",
"delete_tweet",
"get_tweet_reposters",
"create_poll_tweet",
"favorite_tweet",
"unfavorite_tweet",
"bookmark_tweet",
"delete_bookmark"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_user_by_screen_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_me",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_users",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "follow_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unfollow_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mute_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unmute_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_muted",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_blocked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quote_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_tweets",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_quote_tweets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tweet_likers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tweet_reposters",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_poll_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "favorite_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "unfavorite_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "bookmark_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_bookmark",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_all_bookmarks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_bookmarks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_list_timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_dm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b2e45acde95d466e50322f15783c341f609d2aa2a76ed8e929484a6722d5a4c2",
"stats": {
"tools": 26,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}