Xlsx For Ai MCP Server
xlsx-for-ai
npm
v4.0.1
Source verified
Published by senoff — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The MCP server that makes LLMs reliable on real-world Excel spreadsheets. Thin npm client over a hosted API — read, write, diff, redact, and supervise .xlsx files from any MCP-aware agent.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "xlsx_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "xlsx_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool xlsx_eval
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/auto-upgrade.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/auto-upgrade.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } = require('child_process'); const { configPath } = require('./config'); const PKG = 'xlsx-for-ai'; const C
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/auto-upgrade.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/installer-cleanup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/installer-cleanup.js:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const PKG = 'xlsx-for-ai'; function npxCacheBase() { return process.env.XFA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/installer-cleanup.js
low Mutating tool "xlsx_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "xlsx_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool xlsx_eval
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"xlsx-for-ai" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package xlsx-for-ai
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
xlsx_evalruns code / shellxlsx_aggregateno sensitive capabilityxlsx_chartsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_commentsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_conditional_formatsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_convertno sensitive capabilityxlsx_data_cleanno sensitive capabilityxlsx_data_validationsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_describeno sensitive capabilityxlsx_diffno sensitive capability
Show 40 more tools ↓
xlsx_doctorno sensitive capabilityxlsx_external_linksno sensitive capabilityxlsx_filterno sensitive capabilityxlsx_form_controlsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_formulasno sensitive capabilityxlsx_healer_cureno sensitive capabilityxlsx_healer_diagnoseno sensitive capabilityxlsx_healer_intentno sensitive capabilityxlsx_healer_simulateno sensitive capabilityxlsx_hyperlinksno sensitive capabilityxlsx_imagesno sensitive capabilityxlsx_list_sheetsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_macrosno sensitive capabilityxlsx_merged_cellsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_named_rangesno sensitive capabilityxlsx_pivotno sensitive capabilityxlsx_pivot_tablesno sensitive capabilityxlsx_post_slackno sensitive capabilityxlsx_post_teamsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_print_settingsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_propertiesno sensitive capabilityxlsx_protectionno sensitive capabilityxlsx_readno sensitive capabilityxlsx_read_handleno sensitive capabilityxlsx_receiptno sensitive capabilityxlsx_redactno sensitive capabilityxlsx_schemano sensitive capabilityxlsx_session_set_validationsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_slicers_timelinesno sensitive capabilityxlsx_sortno sensitive capabilityxlsx_stampno sensitive capabilityxlsx_stylesno sensitive capabilityxlsx_tablesno sensitive capabilityxlsx_topologyno sensitive capabilityxlsx_validateno sensitive capabilityxlsx_value_countsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_verify_receiptno sensitive capabilityxlsx_verify_stampno sensitive capabilityxlsx_workbook_viewsno sensitive capabilityxlsx_writeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v4.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v3.2.9 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v3.2.8 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v3.2.7 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v3.2.5 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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