Xcodebuildmcp MCP Server
xcodebuildmcp
npm
v2.7.0
Source verified
Published by getsentry — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
XcodeBuildMCP is a Model Context Protocol server that provides tools for Xcode project management, simulator management, and app utilities.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/commands/upgrade.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/cli/commands/upgrade.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import * as clack from "@clack/prompts"; import { version as currentVersion,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/cli/commands/upgrade.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli/daemon-control.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/cli/daemon-control.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { dirname, resolve } from "node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/cli/daemon-control.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/integrations/xcode-tools-bridge/core.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/integrations/xcode-tools-bridge/core.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import process from "node:process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/integrations/xcode-tools-bridge/core.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/snapshot-tests/device-availability.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/snapshot-tests/device-availability.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/snapshot-tests/device-availability.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/snapshot-tests/harness.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/snapshot-tests/harness.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/snapshot-tests/harness.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/snapshot-tests/preflight/command-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/snapshot-tests/preflight/command-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const TERMINATION_GRACE_MS = 1e3; const FORCE_KILL_CLOSE_GRACE_MS = 1e3; const r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/snapshot-tests/preflight/command-runner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/snapshot-tests/suites/macos-suite.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/snapshot-tests/suites/macos-suite.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/snapshot-tests/suites/macos-suite.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/utils/environment.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/utils/environment.js:21`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const parentCommand = execSync(`ps -o command= -p ${parentPid}`, { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 1e3
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/utils/environment.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/core/manifest/import-resource-module.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`build/core/manifest/import-resource-module.js:15`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { mod = await import(moduleUrl); } catch (err) { throw new Error(`Failed to import resource module '${mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/manifest/import-resource-module.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/core/manifest/import-tool-module.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`build/core/manifest/import-tool-module.js:15`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { mod = await import(moduleUrl); } catch (err) { throw new Error(`Failed to import tool module '${module
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/manifest/import-tool-module.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/benchmarks/claude-ui/harness.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/benchmarks/claude-ui/harness.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import { createWriteStream } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/benchmarks/claude-ui/harness.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/benchmarks/claude-ui/preflight-commands.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/benchmarks/claude-ui/preflight-commands.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { buildOpenSimulatorFronten
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/benchmarks/claude-ui/preflight-commands.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/benchmarks/claude-ui/simulator-lifecycle.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/benchmarks/claude-ui/simulator-lifecycle.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { appendFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { openBenchmarkSimulatorFr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/benchmarks/claude-ui/simulator-lifecycle.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.0 latest |
B 88/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.6.2 |
B 88/100 | 17 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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