X64dbg (ouonet) MCP Server
x64dbg-mcp
npm
v1.3.1
Source verified
Published by ouonet — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Production-level Model Context Protocol server for x64dbg reverse engineering and debugging
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([save_memory_dump]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [save_memory_dump] → sinks [execute_command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow save_memory_dump → execute_command
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/launcher.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, execFileSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import net from "net"; import path from "path"; import { co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/launcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; import path from "path"; import { detectSer
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/service/elevate.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/service/elevate.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { transcriptDir, transcriptGlobPattern } from "./paths.js"; export functi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/service/elevate.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/service/privilege.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/service/privilege.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; export function isAdmin() { if (process.platform !== "win32") return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/service/privilege.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/service/status.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/service/status.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { SERVICE_NAME } from "./types.js"; import { readInstalledRecord } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/service/status.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/service/uninstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/service/uninstall.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { SERVICE_NAME } from "./types.js"; import { serviceShimPath, serviceWrap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/service/uninstall.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/debug.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/debug.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import { z } from "zod"; import { BridgeClient } from "../b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/debug.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "execute_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/doctor.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/doctor.mjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import dotenv from "dotenv"; import fs from "fs"; import net from "net"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/doctor.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/install-plugin.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/install-plugin.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; const ROOT = path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/install-plugin.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.mjs:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import os from "os"; import path from "path"; import { file
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"x64dbg-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package x64dbg-mcp
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_commandruns code / shellsave_memory_dumpreads sensitive dataanalyze_functionno sensitive capabilityanalyze_suspicious_apisno sensitive capabilityattach_to_processno sensitive capabilitycheck_section_anomaliesno sensitive capabilityclose_debuggerno sensitive capabilitycollect_bp_argsno sensitive capabilitycontinue_executionno sensitive capabilitycreate_minidumpno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
detach_sessionno sensitive capabilitydetect_anti_debugno sensitive capabilitydetect_packingno sensitive capabilitydisassembleno sensitive capabilityfind_stringsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_security_reportno sensitive capabilityget_call_stackno sensitive capabilityget_cross_referencesno sensitive capabilityget_exportsno sensitive capabilityget_importsno sensitive capabilityget_memory_mapno sensitive capabilityget_modulesno sensitive capabilityget_pe_headerno sensitive capabilityget_registersno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityget_threadsno sensitive capabilitylist_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilityload_executableno sensitive capabilitymy_toolno sensitive capabilitypause_executionno sensitive capabilityread_memoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoryno sensitive capabilitystep_intono sensitive capabilitystep_outno sensitive capabilitystep_overno sensitive capabilityterminate_sessionno sensitive capabilitywait_for_stateno sensitive capabilitywrite_memoryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan x64dbg-mcp --onlineOther implementations of X64dbg 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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