X402engine MCP Server
x402engine-mcp
npm
v1.1.0
Source verified
Published by agentc22 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Agent-friendly MCP wrapper for x402engine with automatic capped USDC payments on Base and Solana
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_wallet_balances, get_token_prices, get_token_metadata]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_code]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_wallet_balances, get_token_prices, get_token_metadata] → sinks [execute_code]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_wallet_balances → execute_code
high Tool "execute_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code
low Mutating tool "execute_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_coderuns code / shellget_token_metadatareads sensitive dataget_token_pricesreads sensitive dataget_wallet_balancesreads sensitive datadiscover_servicesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capabilityget_crypto_categoriesno sensitive capabilityget_crypto_historyno sensitive capabilityget_crypto_marketsno sensitive capabilityget_crypto_priceno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
get_from_ipfsno sensitive capabilityget_trending_cryptono sensitive capabilityget_wallet_pnlno sensitive capabilityget_wallet_transactionsno sensitive capabilitypin_to_ipfsno sensitive capabilitysearch_cheapest_datesno sensitive capabilitysearch_cryptono sensitive capabilitysearch_flightsno sensitive capabilitysearch_hotelsno sensitive capabilitysearch_locationsno sensitive capabilityservice_healthno sensitive capabilitytranscribe_audiono sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.6 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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