x402 Trading & On-Chain Intelligence MCP Server

https://x402-services-production.up.railway.app/mcp Remote v1.0.0

Published by x402-services-production.up.railway.app — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

77 pay-per-call x402 tools for AI trading & on-chain agents: prices, sniping, perps, RH Chain, MEV

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Live
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 13

high Tool "exec_quote" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_quote" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_quote

high Tool "exec_slippage" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_slippage" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_slippage

high Tool "exec_sandwich" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_sandwich" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_sandwich

high Tool "exec_gas" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_gas" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_gas

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([read, read_structured, pubsub_poll, inbox_poll]) co-exist with external-action tools ([schedule, deadman_register, inbox_create, inbox_poll, exec_quote, exec_slippage, exec_sandwich, exec_gas]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [read, read_structured, pubsub_poll, inbox_poll] → sinks [schedule, deadman_register, inbox_create, inbox_poll, exec_quote, exec_slippage, exec_sandwi

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow read → schedule

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "read"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "read" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool read · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "read_structured"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "read_structured" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool read_structured · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "schedule"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "schedule" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool schedule · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "deadman_register"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "deadman_register" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool deadman_register · inputSchema.properties.url

low Mutating tool "exec_quote" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "exec_quote" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool exec_quote

low Mutating tool "exec_slippage" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "exec_slippage" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool exec_slippage

low Mutating tool "exec_sandwich" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "exec_sandwich" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool exec_sandwich

low Mutating tool "exec_gas" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "exec_gas" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool exec_gas

Tools 159

Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.

  • inbox_pollingests untrusted inputnetwork egress
  • deadman_registernetwork egress
  • exec_gasruns code / shell
  • exec_quoteruns code / shell
  • exec_sandwichruns code / shell
  • exec_slippageruns code / shell
  • inbox_createnetwork egress
  • pubsub_pollingests untrusted input
  • readingests untrusted input
  • read_structuredingests untrusted input
Show 149 more tools ↓
  • schedulenetwork egress
  • agent_reputationno sensitive capability
  • ai_chatno sensitive capability
  • ai_chat_prono sensitive capability
  • ai_modelsno sensitive capability
  • analytics_indicatorsno sensitive capability
  • analytics_ohlcvno sensitive capability
  • analytics_price_atno sensitive capability
  • board_getno sensitive capability
  • board_setno sensitive capability
  • business_daysno sensitive capability
  • calcno sensitive capability
  • catalysts_calendarno sensitive capability
  • catalysts_governanceno sensitive capability
  • catalysts_searchno sensitive capability
  • catalysts_unlocksno sensitive capability
  • compliance_labelno sensitive capability
  • compliance_riskno sensitive capability
  • compliance_screenno sensitive capability
  • compliance_taintno sensitive capability
  • counterno sensitive capability
  • cron_explainno sensitive capability
  • crypto_activityno sensitive capability
  • crypto_balancesno sensitive capability
  • crypto_contractno sensitive capability
  • crypto_convertno sensitive capability
  • crypto_ensno sensitive capability
  • crypto_gasno sensitive capability
  • crypto_priceno sensitive capability
  • crypto_tokenno sensitive capability
  • crypto_txno sensitive capability
  • crypto_yieldsno sensitive capability
  • datetimeno sensitive capability
  • deadman_pingno sensitive capability
  • diffno sensitive capability
  • escrow_createno sensitive capability
  • escrow_listno sensitive capability
  • escrow_resolveno sensitive capability
  • escrow_statusno sensitive capability
  • extractno sensitive capability
  • idempotencyno sensitive capability
  • jsonschemano sensitive capability
  • lending_healthno sensitive capability
  • lending_liquidationsno sensitive capability
  • lending_ratesno sensitive capability
  • links_checkno sensitive capability
  • lock_acquireno sensitive capability
  • lock_releaseno sensitive capability
  • markdownno sensitive capability
  • memory_getno sensitive capability
  • memory_setno sensitive capability
  • options_chainno sensitive capability
  • options_greeksno sensitive capability
  • options_maxpainno sensitive capability
  • options_priceno sensitive capability
  • options_volno sensitive capability
  • perps_basisno sensitive capability
  • perps_fundingno sensitive capability
  • perps_funding_arbno sensitive capability
  • perps_marketsno sensitive capability
  • perps_moversno sensitive capability
  • perps_oino sensitive capability
  • portfolio_pnlno sensitive capability
  • portfolio_riskno sensitive capability
  • portfolio_taxlotsno sensitive capability
  • portfolio_valueno sensitive capability
  • predict_arbno sensitive capability
  • predict_feargreedno sensitive capability
  • predict_marketno sensitive capability
  • predict_oddsno sensitive capability
  • predict_trendingno sensitive capability
  • preflightno sensitive capability
  • pubsub_publishno sensitive capability
  • queue_popno sensitive capability
  • queue_pushno sensitive capability
  • ratelimitno sensitive capability
  • regexno sensitive capability
  • rh_arbno sensitive capability
  • rh_basisno sensitive capability
  • rh_catalystsno sensitive capability
  • rh_depthno sensitive capability
  • rh_dislocationno sensitive capability
  • rh_funding_arbno sensitive capability
  • rh_funding_scanno sensitive capability
  • rh_gainersno sensitive capability
  • rh_gap_radarno sensitive capability
  • rh_liquidity_mapno sensitive capability
  • rh_momentumno sensitive capability
  • rh_new_listingsno sensitive capability
  • rh_oracle_deviationno sensitive capability
  • rh_perp_fundingno sensitive capability
  • rh_perp_oino sensitive capability
  • rh_poolno sensitive capability
  • rh_premiumno sensitive capability
  • rh_session_clockno sensitive capability
  • rh_spreadno sensitive capability
  • rh_stockno sensitive capability
  • rh_stocksno sensitive capability
  • rh_tvlno sensitive capability
  • rh_verifyno sensitive capability
  • rh_whale_flowno sensitive capability
  • rh_yieldsno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_activityno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_balanceno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_blockno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_callno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_contractno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_gasno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_logsno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_nonceno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_registryno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_token_transfersno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_txno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_usdgno sensitive capability
  • rhchain_watchno sensitive capability
  • safety_approvalsno sensitive capability
  • safety_decodeno sensitive capability
  • safety_guardrailno sensitive capability
  • safety_simulateno sensitive capability
  • schedule_cronno sensitive capability
  • schedule_statusno sensitive capability
  • scout_rankingsno sensitive capability
  • scout_serviceno sensitive capability
  • snipe_holdersno sensitive capability
  • snipe_honeypotno sensitive capability
  • snipe_impactno sensitive capability
  • snipe_newpairsno sensitive capability
  • snipe_pairno sensitive capability
  • snipe_rhno sensitive capability
  • snipe_safetyno sensitive capability
  • snipe_searchno sensitive capability
  • snipe_trendingno sensitive capability
  • snipe_walletno sensitive capability
  • sol_graduatingno sensitive capability
  • sol_launchesno sensitive capability
  • sol_rug_checkno sensitive capability
  • ton_accountno sensitive capability
  • ton_agent_walletno sensitive capability
  • ton_balanceno sensitive capability
  • ton_blockno sensitive capability
  • ton_dnsno sensitive capability
  • ton_gramno sensitive capability
  • ton_jettonno sensitive capability
  • ton_jetton_holdersno sensitive capability
  • ton_nftsno sensitive capability
  • ton_priceno sensitive capability
  • ton_transfersno sensitive capability
  • ton_txno sensitive capability
  • wallet_reputationno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.0 latest A 94/100 13 1.13.0 2026-09-06

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan https://x402-services-production.up.railway.app/mcp --online

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