Wxo Builder MCP Server
wxo-builder-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.13
Published by markusvankempen — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for IBM Watson Orchestrate (WXO): manage tools, agents, flows, Python tools from Cursor, VS Code, Claude. Deploy from URL, create from tool-spec.json.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:19`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const res = await fetch('https://iam.cloud.ibm.com/identity/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_tool_artifactingests untrusted inputassign_tool_to_agentno sensitive capabilitycompare_instancesno sensitive capabilityconfigure_connectionno sensitive capabilitycopy_skillno sensitive capabilitycreate_agentno sensitive capabilitycreate_connectionno sensitive capabilitycreate_flowno sensitive capabilitycreate_python_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_python_tool_and_uploadno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
create_python_tool_from_tool_spec_jsonno sensitive capabilitycreate_tool_and_assign_to_agentno sensitive capabilitydelete_agentno sensitive capabilitydelete_connectionno sensitive capabilitydelete_flowno sensitive capabilitydelete_skillno sensitive capabilitydeploy_skillno sensitive capabilitydeploy_tool_from_urlno sensitive capabilityexecute_toolno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_agent_chat_starter_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_api_specno sensitive capabilityget_connectionno sensitive capabilityget_flowno sensitive capabilityget_skillno sensitive capabilityinvoke_agentno sensitive capabilitylist_active_live_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_agent_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_connectorsno sensitive capabilitylist_flowsno sensitive capabilitylist_skillsno sensitive capabilitylist_standard_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_tools_with_connectionsno sensitive capabilitytest_tool_localno sensitive capabilityupdate_agentno sensitive capabilityupdate_agent_chat_starter_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_agent_instructions_from_toolsno sensitive capabilityupdate_skillno sensitive capabilityupload_python_tool_artifactno sensitive capabilityvalidate_agentsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.13 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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