Wp Cli MCP Server
wp-cli-mcp
npm
v3.0.0
Published by mvtandas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that gives AI tools full WordPress management via WP-CLI — themes, plugins, posts, menus, users, database, and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([wp_db_query, wp_db_export]) and tools that can send data out ([wp_eval]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [wp_db_query, wp_db_export] → sinks [wp_eval]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow wp_db_query → wp_eval
high Tool "wp_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "wp_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool wp_eval
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/wp-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/wp-cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/wp-cli.js
low Mutating tool "wp_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "wp_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool wp_eval
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
wp_db_exportreads sensitive datawp_db_queryreads sensitive datawp_evalruns code / shellwc_coupon_createno sensitive capabilitywc_order_getno sensitive capabilitywc_order_listno sensitive capabilitywc_product_createno sensitive capabilitywc_product_getno sensitive capabilitywc_product_listno sensitive capabilitywc_product_update_priceno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
wp_cache_flushno sensitive capabilitywp_cli_rawno sensitive capabilitywp_core_check_updateno sensitive capabilitywp_core_versionno sensitive capabilitywp_cron_listno sensitive capabilitywp_cron_runno sensitive capabilitywp_maintenance_modeno sensitive capabilitywp_media_importno sensitive capabilitywp_menu_createno sensitive capabilitywp_menu_item_addno sensitive capabilitywp_menu_listno sensitive capabilitywp_option_getno sensitive capabilitywp_option_updateno sensitive capabilitywp_plugin_activateno sensitive capabilitywp_plugin_deactivateno sensitive capabilitywp_plugin_deleteno sensitive capabilitywp_plugin_installno sensitive capabilitywp_plugin_listno sensitive capabilitywp_plugin_searchno sensitive capabilitywp_post_createno sensitive capabilitywp_post_deleteno sensitive capabilitywp_post_getno sensitive capabilitywp_post_listno sensitive capabilitywp_post_meta_getno sensitive capabilitywp_post_meta_listno sensitive capabilitywp_post_meta_updateno sensitive capabilitywp_post_updateno sensitive capabilitywp_rewrite_flushno sensitive capabilitywp_scaffold_blockno sensitive capabilitywp_scaffold_pluginno sensitive capabilitywp_scaffold_themeno sensitive capabilitywp_search_replaceno sensitive capabilitywp_sidebar_listno sensitive capabilitywp_site_infono sensitive capabilitywp_term_createno sensitive capabilitywp_term_listno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_activateno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_deleteno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_file_deleteno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_file_listno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_file_readno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_file_writeno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_installno sensitive capabilitywp_theme_listno sensitive capabilitywp_transient_delete_allno sensitive capabilitywp_user_createno sensitive capabilitywp_user_listno sensitive capabilitywp_widget_listno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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