Workspace Init MCP Server
workspace-init-mcp
npm
v5.0.0
Published by gabeujin — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/generators/dashboard-operations.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/generators/dashboard-operations.js:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; const API_VERSION = ${JSON.stringify(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/generators/dashboard-operations.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { PROJECT_TYPE_CONFIGS } from "./types.js"; import { collectFiles, buildS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/harness-runtime.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/harness-runtime.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { HARNESS_ADAPTER_CONTRACT_VERS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/harness-runtime.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/managed-inventory.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/managed-inventory.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { WORKSPACE_INIT_MCP_VERSION } from "../data/version.js"; import { analyz
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/managed-inventory.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/reconcile.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/reconcile.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { collectFiles } from "./initialize.js"; import { analyzeWorkspace } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/reconcile.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/semantic-waivers.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/semantic-waivers.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { SEMANTIC_GOVERNANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION, } from "../data/ontology-contract.j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/semantic-waivers.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
activate_harness_sessionno sensitive capabilityadvance_harness_sessionno sensitive capabilityanalyze_workspaceno sensitive capabilityassess_workspace_readinessno sensitive capabilityaudit_harness_parallel_chunk_conflictsno sensitive capabilityaudit_harness_runtimeno sensitive capabilityaudit_workspace_managed_semantic_diffno sensitive capabilityaudit_workspace_readiness_semanticsno sensitive capabilityaudit_workspace_upgrade_riskno sensitive capabilitycompact_harness_runtimeno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
create_server_flow_dashboardno sensitive capabilityenforce_architecture_governanceno sensitive capabilityexport_architecture_policy_packno sensitive capabilityexport_reconcile_preflight_reportno sensitive capabilityget_harness_dashboard_contextno sensitive capabilityget_harness_native_execution_statusno sensitive capabilityget_harness_session_logno sensitive capabilityget_harness_session_statusno sensitive capabilityget_init_form_schemano sensitive capabilityget_semantic_context_packno sensitive capabilityimport_architecture_policy_packno sensitive capabilityinitialize_workspaceno sensitive capabilityinstall_agent_skillsno sensitive capabilitylaunch_harness_native_executorno sensitive capabilitylist_agent_skills_catalogno sensitive capabilitylist_harness_execution_bridgesno sensitive capabilitylist_harness_native_executorsno sensitive capabilitylist_harness_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_harness_runtime_adaptersno sensitive capabilitylist_harness_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_project_typesno sensitive capabilityprepare_harness_adapter_handoffno sensitive capabilityprepare_harness_execution_bridgeno sensitive capabilityprepare_harness_native_executorno sensitive capabilityprepare_harness_work_packetno sensitive capabilitypreview_workspace_initno sensitive capabilityquery_semantic_warehouseno sensitive capabilityrecommend_agent_skillsno sensitive capabilityreconcile_workspace_initializationno sensitive capabilityrecord_harness_execution_resultno sensitive capabilityrestore_reconcile_backupno sensitive capabilityscan_source_graphno sensitive capabilitysearch_agent_skillsno sensitive capabilitystart_harness_sessionno sensitive capabilityvalidate_architecture_governanceno sensitive capabilityvalidate_architecture_waiversno sensitive capabilityvalidate_workspaceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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