@work-graph/mcp
npm
v0.2.21
Published by @work-graph — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tools that read sensitive data ([onebase_read_config_file]) and tools that can send data out ([get_operator_shell_snapshot]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [onebase_read_config_file] → sinks [get_operator_shell_snapshot]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow onebase_read_config_file → get_operator_shell_snapshot
Tool "get_operator_shell_snapshot" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool get_operator_shell_snapshot
Tool "get_operator_shell_snapshot" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool get_operator_shell_snapshot
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_operator_shell_snapshotruns code / shellonebase_read_config_filereads sensitive dataadd_work_item_evidenceno sensitive capabilityassert_task_ready_for_doneno sensitive capabilityattach_work_item_ui_referenceno sensitive capabilityclaim_work_itemno sensitive capabilitycomplete_work_itemno sensitive capabilitycreate_work_itemno sensitive capabilitydetect_semantic_driftno sensitive capabilityfind_semantic_voidsno sensitive capabilityget_analytics_lineageno sensitive capabilityget_architecture_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_backlog_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_context_sliceno sensitive capabilityget_current_cycleno sensitive capabilityget_epic_work_scopeno sensitive capabilityget_evidence_recordno sensitive capabilityget_graph_rag_contextno sensitive capabilityget_intent_hierarchyno sensitive capabilityget_memory_recordno sensitive capabilityget_promote_ready_queueno sensitive capabilityget_pvrg_task_scopeno sensitive capabilityget_step_graph_projectionno sensitive capabilityget_step_graph_sliceno sensitive capabilityget_unified_linkageno sensitive capabilityget_work_contractno sensitive capabilityget_work_itemno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_pipelineno sensitive capabilitygit_snapshotno sensitive capabilitylist_evidence_recordsno sensitive capabilitylist_memory_recordsno sensitive capabilitylist_work_item_ui_referencesno sensitive capabilitylist_work_itemsno sensitive capabilityonebase_check_configno sensitive capabilityonebase_describe_configno sensitive capabilityonebase_list_metadatano sensitive capabilityonebase_rest_getno sensitive capabilityonebase_rest_write_executeno sensitive capabilityonebase_rest_write_prepareno sensitive capabilityquery_intent_planeno sensitive capabilityquery_semantic_fieldno sensitive capabilityread_work_item_atomno sensitive capabilityrecord_work_item_analysisno sensitive capabilityrecord_work_item_decisionno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilityupdate_work_item_statusno sensitive capabilityvalidate_evidenceno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.21 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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