Work Graph MCP Server

@work-graph/mcp npm v0.2.21

Published by @work-graph — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([onebase_read_config_file]) and tools that can send data out ([get_operator_shell_snapshot]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [onebase_read_config_file] → sinks [get_operator_shell_snapshot]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow onebase_read_config_file → get_operator_shell_snapshot

high Tool "get_operator_shell_snapshot" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "get_operator_shell_snapshot" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool get_operator_shell_snapshot

low Mutating tool "get_operator_shell_snapshot" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "get_operator_shell_snapshot" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool get_operator_shell_snapshot

Tools 47

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get_operator_shell_snapshotruns code / shell
  • onebase_read_config_filereads sensitive data
  • add_work_item_evidenceno sensitive capability
  • assert_task_ready_for_doneno sensitive capability
  • attach_work_item_ui_referenceno sensitive capability
  • claim_work_itemno sensitive capability
  • complete_work_itemno sensitive capability
  • create_work_itemno sensitive capability
  • detect_semantic_driftno sensitive capability
  • find_semantic_voidsno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
  • get_analytics_lineageno sensitive capability
  • get_architecture_snapshotno sensitive capability
  • get_backlog_snapshotno sensitive capability
  • get_context_sliceno sensitive capability
  • get_current_cycleno sensitive capability
  • get_epic_work_scopeno sensitive capability
  • get_evidence_recordno sensitive capability
  • get_graph_rag_contextno sensitive capability
  • get_intent_hierarchyno sensitive capability
  • get_memory_recordno sensitive capability
  • get_promote_ready_queueno sensitive capability
  • get_pvrg_task_scopeno sensitive capability
  • get_step_graph_projectionno sensitive capability
  • get_step_graph_sliceno sensitive capability
  • get_unified_linkageno sensitive capability
  • get_work_contractno sensitive capability
  • get_work_itemno sensitive capability
  • get_work_item_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • git_snapshotno sensitive capability
  • list_evidence_recordsno sensitive capability
  • list_memory_recordsno sensitive capability
  • list_work_item_ui_referencesno sensitive capability
  • list_work_itemsno sensitive capability
  • onebase_check_configno sensitive capability
  • onebase_describe_configno sensitive capability
  • onebase_list_metadatano sensitive capability
  • onebase_rest_getno sensitive capability
  • onebase_rest_write_executeno sensitive capability
  • onebase_rest_write_prepareno sensitive capability
  • query_intent_planeno sensitive capability
  • query_semantic_fieldno sensitive capability
  • read_work_item_atomno sensitive capability
  • record_work_item_analysisno sensitive capability
  • record_work_item_decisionno sensitive capability
  • semantic_searchno sensitive capability
  • update_work_item_statusno sensitive capability
  • validate_evidenceno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.21 latest A 93/100 3 1.9.0 2026-07-24

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MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @work-graph/mcp --online

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