Yt Builder MCP Server
@wootsup/yt-builder-mcp
npm
v2.1.1
Published by @wootsup — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
YT Builder MCP — drive your page builder from Claude, Cursor, Codex, Gemini and 5 other MCP-capable AI assistants. Built for YOOtheme Pro 4.0+. Independent third-party project, not affiliated with YOOtheme GmbH.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/yt-builder-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/yt-builder-mcp.js:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { nodeRuntimeRefusal } from '.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/yt-builder-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sites/op-inject.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sites/op-inject.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: deExecFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { mapOpExecError, OP_TIMEOUT_MS, resolveOpBinary, SecretResolverError, }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sites/op-inject.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sites/secret-resolver.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sites/secret-resolver.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: deExecFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { OP_REF_REGEX } from './schema.js'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sites/secret-resolver.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/doctor-command.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor-command.js:150`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/-/ping', { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(PRO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor-command.js
Tools 1
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
yootheme_builder_advancedno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.1.0 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v2.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.12.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.11.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v1.10.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.7.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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