Strudel (williamzujkowski) MCP Server
@williamzujkowski/strudel-mcp-server
npm
v2.4.1
Source verified
Published by williamzujkowski — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Advanced MCP server for AI-powered music generation with Strudel.cc
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/services/StrudelEngine.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/StrudelEngine.js:130`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(this.context), transpileResult.transpiledCode); const pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/StrudelEngine.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/services/GeminiService.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/GeminiService.js:743`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: or safety 7. Do not use eval(), Function(), or any dangerous constructs Return the modified pattern code:`; } /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/GeminiService.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/services/StrudelEngine.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/StrudelEngine.js:130`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(this.context), transpileResult.transpiledCode); const pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/StrudelEngine.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/utils/PatternValidator.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/PatternValidator.js:181`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: errors.push('Use of eval() or Function() is not allowed'); } return { safe: errors.lengt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/PatternValidator.js
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_effectno sensitive capabilityadd_swingno sensitive capabilityanalyzeno sensitive capabilityanalyze_rhythmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_spectrumno sensitive capabilityappendno sensitive capabilityapply_scaleno sensitive capabilitycapture_audio_sampleno sensitive capabilityclearno sensitive capabilitycompare_patternsno sensitive capability
Show 55 more tools ↓
composeno sensitive capabilitycreate_sessionno sensitive capabilitydestroy_sessionno sensitive capabilitydetect_keyno sensitive capabilitydetect_tempono sensitive capabilitydiagnosticsno sensitive capabilityexport_midino sensitive capabilitygenerate_basslineno sensitive capabilitygenerate_chord_progressionno sensitive capabilitygenerate_drumsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_euclideanno sensitive capabilitygenerate_fillno sensitive capabilitygenerate_melodyno sensitive capabilitygenerate_patternno sensitive capabilitygenerate_polyrhythmno sensitive capabilitygenerate_scaleno sensitive capabilitygenerate_variationno sensitive capabilityget_patternno sensitive capabilityget_pattern_feedbackno sensitive capabilityhumanizeno sensitive capabilityinitno sensitive capabilityinsertno sensitive capabilityjam_withno sensitive capabilitylistno sensitive capabilitylist_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilityloadno sensitive capabilitymemory_usageno sensitive capabilitypauseno sensitive capabilityperformance_reportno sensitive capabilityplayno sensitive capabilityquantizeno sensitive capabilityredono sensitive capabilityrefineno sensitive capabilityremove_effectno sensitive capabilityreplaceno sensitive capabilityrestore_historyno sensitive capabilityreverseno sensitive capabilitysaveno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityset_energyno sensitive capabilityset_tempono sensitive capabilityshift_moodno sensitive capabilityshow_browserno sensitive capabilityshow_errorsno sensitive capabilitystart_audio_captureno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitystopno sensitive capabilitystop_audio_captureno sensitive capabilitystretchno sensitive capabilityswitch_sessionno sensitive capabilitytransposeno sensitive capabilityundono sensitive capabilityvalidate_pattern_runtimeno sensitive capabilitywriteno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @williamzujkowski/strudel-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Strudel 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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