Wikey Wallet MCP Server
wikey-wallet-mcp
npm
v1.3.1
Published by bit2safe — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Wikey Wallet MCP — a self-hosted, zero-custody MCP stdio server that exposes the Omnistar wallet/signing stack to a client's own agent through a typed, enforceable tool boundary.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/binPaths.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/binPaths.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { accessSync, constants, readFileSync, readdirSync, existsSync, writeFile
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/binPaths.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/installer.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createWriteStream, existsSync, mkdirSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/installer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/proof.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/proof.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; /** Extract the first balanced JSON object after a "Sign Request:" marker. */ ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/proof.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/query.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/query.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eCb, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFile = promisify(execFileCb); e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/query.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/rotation.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/rotation.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import crypto from 'node:crypto'; function withKillTimeout(ms, label, child, pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/rotation.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/session.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createConnection } from 'node:net'; import { unlink } from 'node:fs/pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/signing.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/signing.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { computeProof, parseSignRequest } from './proof.js'; const ANSI_RE = /\x
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/signing.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/uninstallEnv.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/uninstallEnv.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/uninstallEnv.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server.js:1596`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('node:util'); const run = pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "wallet_notification_configure"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "wallet_notification_configure" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool wallet_notification_configure · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
wallet_notification_configurenetwork egressgetting-startedno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilitywallet_accountno sensitive capabilitywallet_accountsno sensitive capabilitywallet_assetsno sensitive capabilitywallet_balanceno sensitive capabilitywallet_balancesno sensitive capabilitywallet_chain_infono sensitive capabilitywallet_config_getno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
wallet_config_initno sensitive capabilitywallet_config_pathno sensitive capabilitywallet_config_resetno sensitive capabilitywallet_config_setno sensitive capabilitywallet_config_showno sensitive capabilitywallet_gateway_api_callno sensitive capabilitywallet_gateway_loginno sensitive capabilitywallet_gateway_logoutno sensitive capabilitywallet_gateway_mcp_callno sensitive capabilitywallet_gateway_registerno sensitive capabilitywallet_gateway_statusno sensitive capabilitywallet_getting_startedno sensitive capabilitywallet_keys_createno sensitive capabilitywallet_keys_getno sensitive capabilitywallet_keys_listno sensitive capabilitywallet_onboard_sponsorno sensitive capabilitywallet_profileno sensitive capabilitywallet_recovery_helpersno sensitive capabilitywallet_resolve_nameno sensitive capabilitywallet_session_recoverno sensitive capabilitywallet_session_statusno sensitive capabilitywallet_snapshotno sensitive capabilitywallet_snapshot_objectno sensitive capabilitywallet_snapshot_pageno sensitive capabilitywallet_snapshot_queryno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_approve_recoveryno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_checkno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_create_policyno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_create_safeno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_create_transactionno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_create_userno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_delete_policyno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_delete_userno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_edit_helpersno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_edit_policyno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_request_recoveryno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_sendno sensitive capabilitywallet_tx_voteno sensitive capabilitywallet_uninstallno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.2.1 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v1.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v1.1.0 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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