Wigolo MCP Server
wigolo
npm
v0.2.1
Source verified
Published by knockoutez — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Local-first web intelligence MCP server for AI coding agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/antigravity.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/antigravity.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mergeMcpJson, removeMcpJson } from "./utils.js"; const MCP_KEY_PATH = [
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/antigravity.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/claude-code.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/claude-code.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mergeBlock, removeBlock, readAsset, mergeMcpJson } from "./utils.js"; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/claude-code.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/cline.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/cline.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { installSkills } from "./skills/index.js"; function detect() { const c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/cline.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/codex.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/codex.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { parse as parseToml, stringify as stringifyToml } from "@iarna/toml"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/codex.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/cursor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/cursor.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mergeMcpJson, removeMcpJson, readAsset } from "./utils.js"; const MCP_K
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/cursor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/gemini-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/gemini-cli.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mergeMcpJson, removeMcpJson, mergeBlock, removeBlock, readAsset } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/gemini-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/utils.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; function getPackageRoot() { const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/agents/vscode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/agents/vscode.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mergeMcpJson, removeMcpJson, mergeBlock, removeBlock, readAsset } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/agents/vscode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, mkdir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/plugin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/plugin.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, rmSync, statSync } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/plugin.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor.js:261`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch(`http://${cfg.daemonHost}:${cfg.daemonPort}/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/searxng/bootstrap.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/searxng/bootstrap.js:245`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://github.com/searxng/searxng/archive/refs/heads/master.tar.gz"); if (!response.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/searxng/bootstrap.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/searxng/docker.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/searxng/docker.js:13`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ATES) { try { execSync(`${cli} --version`, { stdio: "pipe", timeout: 5e3 }); return _resolvedContainerCl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/searxng/docker.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/fetch/tls-tier.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/fetch/tls-tier.js:32`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(WREQ_MODULE_ID); const fetchFn = mod.fetch ?? mod.default?.fetch; if (!fetchF
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/fetch/tls-tier.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/plugins/loader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/plugins/loader.js:85`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: href; mod = await import(fileUrl); } catch (err) { const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message :
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/plugins/loader.js
Tools 1
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Wigolo usage guideno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
B 88/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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