Whatnext Ai MCP Server
whatnext-ai
npm
v2.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
What Next — AI-powered continuity engine. Your second brain that always knows what happened and what comes next.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 8 = 85. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/wn.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/wn.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import { basename } from 'path'; const BASE = 'http://localhost:3747'; const PO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/wn.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/watcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/watcher.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/watcher.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (bin/update-check.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`bin/update-check.js:52`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch( `https://api.github.com/repos/${GITHUB_REPO}/releases/latest`, { head
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/update-check.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/cloud-server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/cloud-server.js:470`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: `; const res = await fetch('https://api.resend.com/emails', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Authorization
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cloud-server.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/server.js:121`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch( 'https://api.github.com/repos/Danz0zn17/what-next/releases/latest', { headers
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/watcher.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/watcher.js:38`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s) { try { return execSync(`git ${args}`, { cwd, encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 5000, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe']
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/watcher.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/install.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'path'; import { homedir } from 'os'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/install.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"whatnext-ai" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node --input-type=commonjs -e "const fs=require('fs'),os=require('os'),p='node_modules/onnxruntime-node/bin/napi-v3/'+os.platform()+'/'+os.arch()+'/onnxruntime_
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package whatnext-ai
Tools 13
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dump_sessionreads sensitive dataadd_factno sensitive capabilityedit_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_orientationno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoriesno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilitysend_feedbackno sensitive capability
Show 3 more tools ↓
since_last_sessionno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_intelligenceno sensitive capabilitywhats_nextno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
B 85/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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