Webpage MCP Server
webpage-mcp
npm
v0.10.0
Source verified
Published by mcpland — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Webpage MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/mcp/mcp-server-http.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/mcp-server-http.js:3038`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/mcp-server-http.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/mcp/mcp-server-stdio.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/mcp-server-stdio.js:3033`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/mcp-server-stdio.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/directory-picker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/directory-picker.js:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ports); var import_node_child_process = require("node:child_process"); var import_node_os = __toESM(require("node:os"));
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/directory-picker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/engines/child-process-lifecycle.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/child-process-lifecycle.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lue: true }), mod); var child_process_lifecycle_exports = {}; __export(child_process_lifecycle_exports, { CHILD_PROCES
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/engines/child-process-lifecycle.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/engines/claude-process.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/claude-process.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss-spawn")); var import_child_process_lifecycle = require("./child-process-lifecycle"); var import_diagnostic_redaction
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/engines/claude-process.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/open-project.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/open-project.js:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ises"); var import_node_child_process = require("node:child_process"); var import_project_service = require("./project-s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/open-project.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/rpc-dispatcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/rpc-dispatcher.js:5127`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cker.ts var import_node_child_process = require("child_process"); var import_node_os3 = __toESM(require("os")); var DEFA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/rpc-dispatcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:160`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'fs');const cp=require('child_process');const dist='dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(!fs.existsSync(dist)){console.log('S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/mcp-server-http.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/mcp-server-http.js:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'fs');const cp=require('child_process');const dist='dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(!fs.existsSync(dist)){console.log('S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/mcp-server-http.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/mcp-server-stdio.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/mcp-server-stdio.js:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'fs');const cp=require('child_process');const dist='dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(!fs.existsSync(dist)){console.log('S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/mcp-server-stdio.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/register-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/register-tools.js:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'fs');const cp=require('child_process');const dist='dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(!fs.existsSync(dist)){console.log('S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/register-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/native-messaging-host.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/native-messaging-host.js:160`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'fs');const cp=require('child_process');const dist='dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(!fs.existsSync(dist)){console.log('S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/native-messaging-host.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/agent/engines/claude.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/claude.js:184`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eName", "return import(moduleName)" )(sdkModuleName); query = sdk.query; } catch (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/engines/claude.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:9840`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eName", "return import(moduleName)" )(sdkModuleName); query = sdk.query; } catch (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/native-messaging-host.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/native-messaging-host.js:9860`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eName", "return import(moduleName)" )(sdkModuleName); query = sdk.query; } catch (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/native-messaging-host.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/server/index.js:9603`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eName", "return import(moduleName)" )(sdkModuleName); query = sdk.query; } catch (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"webpage-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "const fs=require('fs');const cp=require('child_process');const dist='dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(!fs.existsSync(dist)){console.log('Skipping mcp-se
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package webpage-mcp
Tools 1
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
webpage-mcpno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.10.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.9.0 |
A 93/100 | 15 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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