Webhook — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "webhook-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "webhook-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "webhook-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (services/bugbounty_service.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`services/bugbounty_service.py:260`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "services/bugbounty_service.py"
},
"evidence": "s[\"base64\"] = f'<script>eval(atob(\"{self._base64_encode(encoded_fetch)}\"))</script>' payloads[\"unicode\"] = self.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "services/bugbounty_service.py",
"line": 260,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (evals/run_evals.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`evals/run_evals.py:75`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "evals/run_evals.py"
},
"evidence": "del\", model] proc = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "evals/run_evals.py",
"line": 75,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([download_request_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, configure_webhook, delete_webhook, export_webhook_data]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "download_request_file → create_webhook"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [download_request_file] → sinks [create_webhook, configure_webhook, delete_webhook, export_webhook_data]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"download_request_file"
],
"sinks": [
"create_webhook",
"configure_webhook",
"delete_webhook",
"export_webhook_data"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"download_request_file"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"create_webhook",
"configure_webhook",
"delete_webhook",
"export_webhook_data"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "server_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "configure_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_webhook_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_webhook_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_webhooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_webhook_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download_request_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_all_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_webhook_data",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "wait_for_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait_for_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "respond_to_next_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "follow_email_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_custom_actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_schedules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_global_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_queues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_databases",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_oob_payloads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_for_callbacks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_links_from_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "612ec3b83a6c89cfefd0f3af3fe2a8238c8b06e05d4b8fd112a7a2729cb85352",
"stats": {
"tools": 31,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}