Webflow (npm) MCP Server
webflow-mcp
npm
v0.4.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
WebFlow MCP MVP with local flow workspaces and MCP tool exposure
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/commands/login.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/commands/login.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { hostname } from 'node:os'; import { assertSecureRelayUrl, clearCredenti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/commands/login.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/runner/cdp-session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/runner/cdp-session.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { get as httpGet } from 'node:http'; import { chromium } from 'playwright
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/runner/cdp-session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/runner/chrome.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/runner/chrome.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; /** * Locate a real Google Chrome executable. The user can always override with
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/runner/chrome.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/worker/lifecycle.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/worker/lifecycle.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { loadCredentials } from '../shared/credentials.js'; import { ensureDir,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/worker/lifecycle.js
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_catalogingests untrusted inputadd_to_repertoireno sensitive capabilityapprove_flow_updateno sensitive capabilitycancel_flow_runno sensitive capabilitycheck_profile_statusno sensitive capabilitydescribe_flowno sensitive capabilityget_configno sensitive capabilityget_flow_run_resultno sensitive capabilityget_flow_run_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_flow_approvalsno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
list_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_recent_flow_runsno sensitive capabilitylogoutno sensitive capabilityrefresh_profile_instanceno sensitive capabilityremove_from_repertoireno sensitive capabilityreset_profileno sensitive capabilityrevoke_flow_approvalno sensitive capabilityrun_flow_onceno sensitive capabilityrun_flow_with_optionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_flowsno sensitive capabilityset_browser_modeno sensitive capabilityset_browser_visibilityno sensitive capabilitystart_flow_runno sensitive capabilitystart_profile_loginno sensitive capabilitystart_workerno sensitive capabilitystop_workerno sensitive capabilityworker_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan webflow-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Webflow 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
Webflow MCP Pack
A Node.js server implementing Model Context Protocol (MCP) for Webflow using the [Webflow JavaScript SDK](https://github.com/webflow/js-webflow-api). Enable AI agents to interact with Webflow APIs. Learn more about Webflow's Data API in the [developer doc
A Node.js server implementing Model Context Protocol (MCP) for Webflow using the [Webflow JavaScript SDK](https://github.com/webflow/js-webflow-api). Enable AI agents to interact with Webflow APIs. Learn more about Webflow's Data API in the [developer doc
More in Content Management
Apify MCP Server
Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server for the *@inkeep/agents-mcp* API.
Medicare spending, chronic conditions, hospital quality, readmissions, and enrollment
Public read-only MCP for products, frameworks, guides, methodology, and blog metadata.
Community-maintained MCP server for Atlassian Confluence Data Center. Not affiliated with Atlassian.
MCP server for Contentful Content Management API integration