Webasyst MCP Server
webasyst-mcp-server
npm
v2.2.0
Published by emmy-design — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP сервер для Webasyst: приложения, плагины, виджеты, темы, UI 2.0
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "run_webasyst_cli" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_webasyst_cli" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_webasyst_cli
high Shell/command execution in server code (webasyst-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`webasyst-mcp.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn, execSync } from 'child_process'; // ========= Utils ========= const toCamelCase = (s) => s.replace(/[-_](.)/g, (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server webasyst-mcp.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (webasyst-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`webasyst-mcp.js:1319`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: уйте шаблон'); try { execSync(`msgfmt "${poPath}" -o "${moPath}"`); return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: `MO ск
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server webasyst-mcp.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_webasyst_cli"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_webasyst_cli" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_webasyst_cli · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "run_webasyst_cli" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_webasyst_cli" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_webasyst_cli
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
run_webasyst_cliruns code / shellanalyze_projectno sensitive capabilitycheck_project_complianceno sensitive capabilitycompile_mono sensitive capabilitycreate_actionno sensitive capabilitycreate_app_structureno sensitive capabilitycreate_generic_appno sensitive capabilitycreate_modelno sensitive capabilitycreate_payment_pluginno sensitive capabilitycreate_plugin_structureno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
create_responsive_layoutno sensitive capabilitycreate_shipping_pluginno sensitive capabilitycreate_shop_pluginno sensitive capabilitycreate_shop_reportno sensitive capabilitycreate_shop_themeno sensitive capabilitycreate_site_blockno sensitive capabilitycreate_site_pluginno sensitive capabilitycreate_site_themeno sensitive capabilitycreate_site_widgetno sensitive capabilitycreate_themeno sensitive capabilitycreate_ui_componentno sensitive capabilitycreate_widgetno sensitive capabilityenable_webasyst_uino sensitive capabilitygenerate_color_schemeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_htaccessno sensitive capabilitygenerate_nginx_vhostno sensitive capabilitygenerate_po_templateno sensitive capabilityget_app_infono sensitive capabilityget_plugin_infono sensitive capabilityget_routing_configno sensitive capabilityget_system_configno sensitive capabilitylist_app_pluginsno sensitive capabilitylist_app_themesno sensitive capabilitylist_app_widgetsno sensitive capabilitylist_webasyst_appsno sensitive capabilityprepare_release_bundleno sensitive capabilitysetup_seo_optimizationno sensitive capabilityvalidate_ui_usageno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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