Webability MCP Server
@webability/mcp
npm
v1.6.0
Published by @webability — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
WebAbility MCP server — WCAG 2.2 / ADA / EAA accessibility scanning with three-tier confidence output (issues + incomplete + summary), framework-aware AI fix suggestions, and brand-palette contrast checks. For Cursor, Claude Code, and other IDEs.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunk-AALQPE6K.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-AALQPE6K.js:55`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } return out; `,Kt=new Function("selectors",Jt);async function he(t,e){let r=[...new Set(e.filter(n=>typeof n=="str
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-AALQPE6K.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-AALQPE6K.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-AALQPE6K.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort{execFile as cn}from"child_process";import{promisify as un}from"util";import{readFileSync as dn}from"fs";import{homed
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-AALQPE6K.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "start_audit"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "start_audit" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool start_audit · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_auditingests untrusted inputscan_historyingests untrusted inputstart_auditingests untrusted inputcheck_ariano sensitive capabilitycheck_color_contrastno sensitive capabilitydetect_frameworkno sensitive capabilitydiff_scanno sensitive capabilityfind_sourceno sensitive capabilityflow_scanno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_fixno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
generate_report_pdfno sensitive capabilityget_rulesno sensitive capabilityscan_htmlno sensitive capabilityscan_pageno sensitive capabilityverify_fixno sensitive capabilityvisual_auditno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.4.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v1.3.3 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v1.3.2 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v1.3.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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