Hord MCP Server
@weave_protocol/hord
npm
v0.1.7
Source verified
Published by tyox-all — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The Vault Protocol - Cryptographic containment and capability management for AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/constants.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/constants.js:127`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /require\s*\(['"](child_process|net|http|https)['"]\)/i, ], // Max execution time before auto-kill MAX
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/constants.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sandbox/executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sandbox/executor.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sandbox/executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/constants.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/constants.ts:156`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , /require\s*\(['"](child_process|net|http|https)['"]\)/i, ], // Max execution time before auto-kill MAX_TI
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/constants.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/sandbox/executor.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/sandbox/executor.ts:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, ChildProcess } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/sandbox/executor.ts
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
hord_attest_actionno sensitive capabilityhord_create_redaction_policyno sensitive capabilityhord_create_sandboxno sensitive capabilityhord_create_vaultno sensitive capabilityhord_delegate_capabilityno sensitive capabilityhord_destroy_sandboxno sensitive capabilityhord_detokenizeno sensitive capabilityhord_execute_in_sandboxno sensitive capabilityhord_export_audit_logno sensitive capabilityhord_get_attestation_chainno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
hord_get_attestationsno sensitive capabilityhord_get_sandbox_resultsno sensitive capabilityhord_list_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityhord_list_redaction_policiesno sensitive capabilityhord_list_vaultsno sensitive capabilityhord_open_vaultno sensitive capabilityhord_promote_sandbox_resultno sensitive capabilityhord_redact_contentno sensitive capabilityhord_request_capabilityno sensitive capabilityhord_retrieve_memoriesno sensitive capabilityhord_retrieve_secretno sensitive capabilityhord_revoke_capabilityno sensitive capabilityhord_seal_vaultno sensitive capabilityhord_store_memoryno sensitive capabilityhord_store_secretno sensitive capabilityhord_tokenize_piino sensitive capabilityhord_verify_attestationno sensitive capabilityhord_verify_capabilityno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.7 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @weave_protocol/hord --onlineMore in Security & Testing
The Stripe Agent Toolkit enables popular agent frameworks including LangChain and Vercel's AI SDK to integrate with Stripe APIs through function calling.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for AgentGate. Enables Claude and other MCP-compatible AI assistants to request approvals.
Scan any website for AI agent readiness, payment protocols, and discovery endpoints
MCP server for aigently security guardrails — reads static catalog-data JSON, zero API dependency
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.