Weixin Minigame Helper MCP Server
@weadmin/weixin-minigame-helper-mcp
npm
v0.1.23
Published by @weadmin — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
WeChat Mini Game MCP Server - Preview, debug, real-device preview and publish
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`mcp/index.js:2947`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/index.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (media/wx-compat.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`media/wx-compat.js:10515`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const factory = new Function( "wx", "canvas", "postMessage", "sharedCanvas",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server media/wx-compat.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/game-bundler-worker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/game-bundler-worker.js:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { (0, import_child_process.execSync)(cmd, { cwd: dir, stdio: "pipe", timeout: 18e4, /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/game-bundler-worker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp/index.js:6901`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { (0, import_child_process.execSync)(cmd, { cwd: dir, stdio: "pipe", timeout: 18e4, /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (mcp/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`mcp/index.js:26280`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Progress); const ci = require(ciPath); onProgress?.("\u6B63\u5728\u521D\u59CB\u5316\u8C03\u8BD5\u914D\u7F6E\u2026");
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/index.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.23 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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