Warp (Ringer) MCP Server
warp-mcp
npm
v1.1.0
Source verified
Published by ringer — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for the Ringer WARP platform — SIP trunking, numbers, porting, messaging, billing, and CDR analytics
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: cdr_export_csv → num_update_sms → msg_get. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow cdr_export_csv → num_update_sms → msg_get
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "num_update_sms"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "num_update_sms" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow num_update_sms
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "inbound_webhook_url" on "num_update_sms"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "num_update_sms" takes a URL/host parameter "inbound_webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool num_update_sms · inputSchema.properties.inbound_webhook_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "fallback_inbound_url" on "num_update_sms"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "num_update_sms" takes a URL/host parameter "fallback_inbound_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool num_update_sms · inputSchema.properties.fallback_inbound_url
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { stdin, stdout } from "node:process"; import { CONFIG_DIR, CONFIG_FILE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`postinstall.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { join, dirname } from "node:pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server postinstall.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"warp-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package warp-mcp
Tools 135
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
num_update_smsnetwork egressreads sensitive datacdr_export_csvingests untrusted inputmsg_getnetwork egressmsg_list_numbersnetwork egressmsg_list_use_casesingests untrusted inputmsg_remove_numbersnetwork egressmsg_sendnetwork egressnum_delete_sms_confignetwork egressnum_getnetwork egressnum_listingests untrusted input
Show 125 more tools ↓
num_ordernetwork egressnum_update_metadatanetwork egressport_download_documentingests untrusted inputacct_get_balanceno sensitive capabilityacct_get_capacityno sensitive capabilityacct_get_utilizationno sensitive capabilityacct_list_scopesno sensitive capabilitybill_get_balanceno sensitive capabilitybill_get_invoiceno sensitive capabilitybill_get_invoice_htmlno sensitive capabilitybill_list_invoicesno sensitive capabilitybill_list_ledgerno sensitive capabilitycdr_get_dashboard_statsno sensitive capabilitycdr_get_detailsno sensitive capabilitycdr_get_statisticsno sensitive capabilitycdr_get_trendsno sensitive capabilitykey_getno sensitive capabilitykey_get_auditno sensitive capabilitykey_get_audit_allno sensitive capabilitykey_listno sensitive capabilitymsg_assign_numbersno sensitive capabilitymsg_create_brandno sensitive capabilitymsg_create_campaignno sensitive capabilitymsg_delete_brandno sensitive capabilitymsg_elect_cnpno sensitive capabilitymsg_get_brandno sensitive capabilitymsg_get_campaignno sensitive capabilitymsg_get_mno_statusno sensitive capabilitymsg_get_sharing_statusno sensitive capabilitymsg_get_statsno sensitive capabilitymsg_get_throughput_estimateno sensitive capabilitymsg_get_use_case_requirementsno sensitive capabilitymsg_link_brandno sensitive capabilitymsg_link_campaignno sensitive capabilitymsg_listno sensitive capabilitymsg_list_brandsno sensitive capabilitymsg_list_campaign_numbersno sensitive capabilitymsg_list_campaignsno sensitive capabilitymsg_list_carriersno sensitive capabilitymsg_list_dcasno sensitive capabilitymsg_list_entity_typesno sensitive capabilitymsg_list_verticalsno sensitive capabilitymsg_lookup_brandno sensitive capabilitymsg_lookup_campaignno sensitive capabilitymsg_nudge_cnpno sensitive capabilitymsg_resubmit_campaignno sensitive capabilitymsg_update_brandno sensitive capabilitymsg_update_campaignno sensitive capabilitynet_get_ingress_ipsno sensitive capabilitynet_get_vendor_ipsno sensitive capabilitynum_bulk_orderno sensitive capabilitynum_bulk_routeno sensitive capabilitynum_delete_voice_configno sensitive capabilitynum_get_port_out_pinno sensitive capabilitynum_releaseno sensitive capabilitynum_remove_port_out_pinno sensitive capabilitynum_searchno sensitive capabilitynum_set_port_out_pinno sensitive capabilitynum_update_voiceno sensitive capabilityport_activateno sensitive capabilityport_add_noteno sensitive capabilityport_add_tnsno sensitive capabilityport_auto_fixno sensitive capabilityport_cancel_requestno sensitive capabilityport_create_requestno sensitive capabilityport_delete_documentno sensitive capabilityport_delete_draftno sensitive capabilityport_execute_transferno sensitive capabilityport_generate_loano sensitive capabilityport_get_error_groupsno sensitive capabilityport_get_historyno sensitive capabilityport_get_progressno sensitive capabilityport_get_requestno sensitive capabilityport_get_statisticsno sensitive capabilityport_list_documentsno sensitive capabilityport_list_notesno sensitive capabilityport_list_requestsno sensitive capabilityport_lookup_company_detailsno sensitive capabilityport_lookup_einno sensitive capabilityport_previewno sensitive capabilityport_preview_transferno sensitive capabilityport_resubmit_requestno sensitive capabilityport_revalidate_tnsno sensitive capabilityport_set_auto_activationno sensitive capabilityport_set_group_detailsno sensitive capabilityport_submit_requestno sensitive capabilityport_supplement_due_dateno sensitive capabilityport_upload_documentno sensitive capabilityport_validate_ein_formatno sensitive capabilityport_validate_requestno sensitive capabilityport_verify_tin_nameno sensitive capabilityteam_create_roleno sensitive capabilityteam_delete_roleno sensitive capabilityteam_duplicate_roleno sensitive capabilityteam_get_roleno sensitive capabilityteam_list_membersno sensitive capabilityteam_list_rolesno sensitive capabilityteam_remove_memberno sensitive capabilityteam_update_member_roleno sensitive capabilityteam_update_roleno sensitive capabilitytrunk_add_ip_aclno sensitive capabilitytrunk_createno sensitive capabilitytrunk_create_credentialno sensitive capabilitytrunk_create_endpointno sensitive capabilitytrunk_deleteno sensitive capabilitytrunk_delete_credentialno sensitive capabilitytrunk_delete_endpointno sensitive capabilitytrunk_delete_ip_aclno sensitive capabilitytrunk_getno sensitive capabilitytrunk_get_cascade_previewno sensitive capabilitytrunk_get_endpointno sensitive capabilitytrunk_get_throttle_stateno sensitive capabilitytrunk_listno sensitive capabilitytrunk_list_credential_callsno sensitive capabilitytrunk_list_credential_registrationsno sensitive capabilitytrunk_list_credentialsno sensitive capabilitytrunk_list_endpointsno sensitive capabilitytrunk_list_ipsno sensitive capabilitytrunk_revoke_registrationno sensitive capabilitytrunk_rotate_credentialno sensitive capabilitytrunk_updateno sensitive capabilitytrunk_update_credentialno sensitive capabilitytrunk_update_endpointno sensitive capabilitytrunk_update_ip_aclno sensitive capabilitywarp_statusno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 2
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (135 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.2 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan warp-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Warp 1
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