Llxprt Code MCP Server
@vybestack/llxprt-code-mcp
npm
v0.10.0
Source verified
Published by vybestack — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
LLxprt Code MCP — Model Context Protocol client, OAuth, and token storage
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/src/hooks/hookRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/src/hooks/hookRunner.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { HookEventName } from './types.js'; import { DebugLogger } from '../debu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/src/hooks/hookRunner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/src/services/gitService.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/src/services/gitService.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { simpleGit, CheckRepoActions } from 'simple-git'; import { ensureDir } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/src/services/gitService.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/src/services/shellCpHelpers.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/src/services/shellCpHelpers.js:149`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: executionMethod: 'child_process', }; } /** Register exit/close event handlers on the child process. */ export
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/src/services/shellCpHelpers.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/src/services/shellExecutionService.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/src/services/shellExecutionService.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as cpSpawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { getPty } from '../utils/getPty.js'; import { getShellConfiguration } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/src/services/shellExecutionService.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/src/services/shellProcessKill.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/src/services/shellProcessKill.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as cpSpawn } from 'node:child_process'; export const SIGKILL_TIMEOUT_MS = 200; /** * Fire-and-forget taskkill on Window
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/src/services/shellProcessKill.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/src/utils/editor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/src/utils/editor.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { coreEvents, CoreEvent } from './events.js'; import { debugLogger } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/src/utils/editor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/src/utils/secure-browser-launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/src/utils/secure-browser-launcher.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/src/utils/secure-browser-launcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/src/tools/ast-edit/repository-context-provider.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/src/tools/ast-edit/repository-context-provider.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; const GIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000; const GIT_MAX_BUFFER = 1024 * 1024; /** * Reposito
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/src/tools/ast-edit/repository-context-provider.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/src/tools/grep/search-strategies.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/src/tools/grep/search-strategies.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { globStream } from 'glob'; import { getErrorMessage, isNodeError } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/src/tools/grep/search-strategies.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/src/tools/ripGrep.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/src/tools/ripGrep.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; // import { rgPath } from '@lvce-editor/ripgrep'; // Now using getRipgrepPath()
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/src/tools/ripGrep.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.10.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.10.0-nightly.260613.bda4680cd |
A 98/100 | 0 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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