Agentic Devtools MCP Server
@vucinatim/agentic-devtools
npm
v0.3.3
Source verified
Published by vucinatim — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| ✓ | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/config-store.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/config-store.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/config-store.mjs
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.mjs:87`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import(tool.mcpModule)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/tools/npm/client.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/tools/npm/client.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/npm/client.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/tools/npm/trust-cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/tools/npm/trust-cli.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/npm/trust-cli.mjs
Tools 111
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
getNpmPackageInfoingests untrusted inputaddDomainDnsRecordno sensitive capabilityaddNpmGitHubTrustedPublisherno sensitive capabilitycheckNpmPackageNameAvailabilityno sensitive capabilitycleanupCloudflareTunnelConnectionsno sensitive capabilityconnectAxiomno sensitive capabilityconnectCloudflareno sensitive capabilityconnectNamecheapno sensitive capabilityconnectNpmno sensitive capabilityconnectRailwayno sensitive capabilityconnectRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilitycreateCloudflareDnsRecordno sensitive capabilitycreateCloudflareR2ApiTokenno sensitive capabilitycreateCloudflareR2Bucketno sensitive capabilitycreateCloudflareR2CustomDomainno sensitive capabilitycreateCloudflareTunnelno sensitive capabilitycreateRailwayCustomDomainno sensitive capabilitycreateRailwayEnvironmentno sensitive capabilitycreateRailwayProjectno sensitive capabilitycreateRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilitycreateRailwayServiceDomainno sensitive capabilitycreateRailwayVolumeno sensitive capabilitydeleteCloudflareDnsRecordno sensitive capabilitydeleteCloudflareR2Bucketno sensitive capabilitydeleteCloudflareR2CustomDomainno sensitive capabilitydeleteCloudflareTunnelno sensitive capabilitydeleteNpmTrustedPublisherno sensitive capabilitydeleteRailwayCustomDomainno sensitive capabilitydeleteRailwayEnvironmentno sensitive capabilitydeleteRailwayProjectno sensitive capabilitydeleteRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilitydeleteRailwayServiceDomainno sensitive capabilitydeleteRailwayVariableno sensitive capabilitydeleteRailwayVolumeno sensitive capabilitydeployRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilitydisconnectAxiomno sensitive capabilitydisconnectCloudflareno sensitive capabilitydisconnectNamecheapno sensitive capabilitydisconnectNpmno sensitive capabilitydisconnectRailwayno sensitive capabilitydisconnectRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilitydoctorRailwayProjectno sensitive capabilityexchangeNpmOidcTokenno sensitive capabilityfoono sensitive capabilitygetAuthStatusno sensitive capabilitygetAxiomAuthStatusno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareAuthStatusno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareDnsRecordno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareR2Bucketno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareR2CustomDomainno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareR2ManagedDomainno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareTunnelno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareTunnelConfigurationno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareTunnelTokenno sensitive capabilitygetCloudflareZoneno sensitive capabilitygetDomainDnsno sensitive capabilitygetNpmAuthStatusno sensitive capabilitygetNpmPackageDistTagsno sensitive capabilitygetNpmPackageVersionsno sensitive capabilitygetNpmPackageVisibilityno sensitive capabilitygetNpmTrustedPublishersno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayAuthStatusno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayCustomDomainno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayDeploymentno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayEnvironmentno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayProjectno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayServiceInstanceno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayServiceInstanceLimitsno sensitive capabilitygetRailwayViewerno sensitive capabilityinspectRailwayProjectTokenno sensitive capabilitylistCloudflareAccountsno sensitive capabilitylistCloudflareDnsRecordsno sensitive capabilitylistCloudflareR2Bucketsno sensitive capabilitylistCloudflareR2CustomDomainsno sensitive capabilitylistCloudflareTunnelConnectionsno sensitive capabilitylistCloudflareTunnelsno sensitive capabilitylistCloudflareZonesno sensitive capabilitylistDomainsno sensitive capabilitylistNpmTokensno sensitive capabilitylistRailwayDeploymentsno sensitive capabilitylistRailwayEnvironmentsno sensitive capabilitylistRailwayProjectMembersno sensitive capabilitylistRailwayProjectsno sensitive capabilitypublishNpmPackageDirectoryno sensitive capabilityredeployRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilityremoveDomainDnsRecordno sensitive capabilityreplaceDomainDnsno sensitive capabilitysetNpmPackageAccessno sensitive capabilitysetupNpmGitHubTrustedPublisherno sensitive capabilitytestAxiomConnectionno sensitive capabilitytestCloudflareConnectionno sensitive capabilitytestNamecheapConnectionno sensitive capabilitytestNpmConnectionno sensitive capabilitytestRailwayConnectionno sensitive capabilitytransferRailwayProjectno sensitive capabilityupdateCloudflareDnsRecordno sensitive capabilityupdateCloudflareR2Bucketno sensitive capabilityupdateCloudflareR2CustomDomainno sensitive capabilityupdateCloudflareR2ManagedDomainno sensitive capabilityupdateCloudflareTunnelno sensitive capabilityupdateCloudflareTunnelConfigurationno sensitive capabilityupdateDomainDnsRecordno sensitive capabilityupdateRailwayCustomDomainno sensitive capabilityupdateRailwayProjectno sensitive capabilityupdateRailwayServiceno sensitive capabilityupdateRailwayServiceDomainno sensitive capabilityupdateRailwayServiceInstanceno sensitive capabilityupdateRailwayServiceInstanceLimitsno sensitive capabilityupsertRailwayVariableno sensitive capabilitywaitForRailwayCustomDomainno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (111 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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