Vscode Automation MCP Server
vscode-automation-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by sukarth — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An MCP server that enables AI agents to automate VSCode by allowing them to interact with the UI, execute commands, inspect the DOM, and control the editor programmatically
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([vscode_dump_dom_to_file]) and tools that can send data out ([vscode_execute_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [vscode_dump_dom_to_file] → sinks [vscode_execute_command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow vscode_dump_dom_to_file → vscode_execute_command
high Tool "vscode_execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "vscode_execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool vscode_execute_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/vscode-driver.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/vscode-driver.js:356`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); try { // Use WMIC to find and kill processe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/vscode-driver.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/vscode-driver.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/vscode-driver.js:360`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '); execSync(`wmic process where "ExecutablePath like '%${path.basename(path.dirname(normalizedPath)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/vscode-driver.js
low Mutating tool "vscode_execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "vscode_execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool vscode_execute_command
Tools 61
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
vscode_dump_dom_to_filereads sensitive datavscode_execute_commandruns code / shellvscode_assert_textno sensitive capabilityvscode_check_file_openno sensitive capabilityvscode_clear_consoleno sensitive capabilityvscode_click_elementno sensitive capabilityvscode_click_menu_itemno sensitive capabilityvscode_dismiss_notificationno sensitive capabilityvscode_drag_dropno sensitive capabilityvscode_execute_scriptno sensitive capability
Show 51 more tools ↓
vscode_find_interactive_elementsno sensitive capabilityvscode_focus_elementno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_accessibility_treeno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_completion_itemsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_console_logsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_devtools_infono sensitive capabilityvscode_get_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_domno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_editor_contentno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_elementno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_element_by_idno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_element_childrenno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_element_parentsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_element_siblingsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_elements_by_classno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_elements_by_tagno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_extension_logsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_menu_itemsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_notificationsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_output_channel_contentno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_output_channelsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_performance_metricsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_problems_panelno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_quick_pick_itemsno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_statusno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_tooltipno sensitive capabilityvscode_get_ui_structureno sensitive capabilityvscode_go_to_definitionno sensitive capabilityvscode_handle_dialogno sensitive capabilityvscode_hoverno sensitive capabilityvscode_initializeno sensitive capabilityvscode_list_commandsno sensitive capabilityvscode_open_context_menuno sensitive capabilityvscode_open_fileno sensitive capabilityvscode_open_webviewno sensitive capabilityvscode_press_keysno sensitive capabilityvscode_query_elementsno sensitive capabilityvscode_query_selectorno sensitive capabilityvscode_scrollno sensitive capabilityvscode_search_domno sensitive capabilityvscode_select_completion_itemno sensitive capabilityvscode_select_quick_pick_itemno sensitive capabilityvscode_take_screenshotno sensitive capabilityvscode_trigger_completionno sensitive capabilityvscode_trigger_hoverno sensitive capabilityvscode_trigger_signature_helpno sensitive capabilityvscode_type_textno sensitive capabilityvscode_verify_elementno sensitive capabilityvscode_wait_for_elementno sensitive capabilityvscode_wait_for_idleno sensitive capabilityvscode_wait_for_textno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan vscode-automation-mcp --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.