Voyageai Cli — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "voyageai-cli",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "voyageai-cli"
},
"server": {
"name": "voyageai-cli"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/app.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/commands/app.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/commands/app.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } = require('child_process'); const https = require('https'); const path = require('path'); const fs = requir",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/commands/app.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/bug.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/commands/bug.js:121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/commands/bug.js"
},
"evidence": "nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const command = os.platform() === 'darwin' ? 'open' : os.pl",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/commands/bug.js",
"line": 121,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/commands/doctor.js:433`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/commands/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); console.log(pc.cyan('\\n Installing pdf-parse...')); try { execSync('np",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/commands/doctor.js",
"line": 433,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/playground.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/commands/playground.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/commands/playground.js"
},
"evidence": "nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const crypto = require('crypto'); /** * Load announcements from the markdown",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/commands/playground.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/workflow.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/commands/workflow.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/commands/workflow.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); return execSync('git config user.name', { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim(); } c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/commands/workflow.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/export/formats/clipboard-export.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/export/formats/clipboard-export.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/export/formats/clipboard-export.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); /** * Copy text content to the system clipboard. *",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/lib/export/formats/clipboard-export.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/npm-utils.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/npm-utils.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/npm-utils.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); const WORKFLOW_PREFIX",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/lib/npm-utils.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/workflow-builder.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/workflow-builder.js:738`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/workflow-builder.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); return execSync('git config user.name', { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim(); } c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/lib/workflow-builder.js",
"line": 738,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/nano/nano-health.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/nano/nano-health.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/nano/nano-health.js"
},
"evidence": "eSync } = require('node:child_process'); const fs = require('node:fs'); const path = require('node:path'); const os = re",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/nano/nano-health.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/commands/playground.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/commands/playground.js:1012`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/commands/playground.js"
},
"evidence": "const regRes = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodedName}/latest`, { headers: { 'Accept':",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/commands/playground.js",
"line": 1012,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/lib/codegen.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/codegen.js:21`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/codegen.js"
},
"evidence": ") { const pkg = require(pkgPath); if (pkg.version) return pkg.version; } } catch { // Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/lib/codegen.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/mcp/install.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/mcp/install.js:391`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp/install.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); try { const version = execSync('vai --version', { encoding: 'utf8', timeo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp/install.js",
"line": 391,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "vai_generate_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_validate_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_code_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_code_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_code_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_code_find_similar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_code_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_embed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_similarity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_multimodal_embed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_ingest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_collections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_rerank",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_topics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_explain",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vai_estimate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_index_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vai_explain_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "5d0eede9633ea42ada661061fcf2d5d074704b5c3ada03529ce3700df5a3923a",
"stats": {
"tools": 22,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}