Vouch Kb MCP Server
vouch-kb
PyPI
v1.5.0
Published by plind-junior — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Git-native, review-gated knowledge base for LLM agents. MCP server + CLI.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Tool "kb_eval_embeddings" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "kb_eval_embeddings" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool kb_eval_embeddings
high Shell/command execution in server code (adapters/openclaw/vouch-context-engine.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`adapters/openclaw/vouch-context-engine.mjs:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; export const ENGINE_ID = 'vouch'; export const ENGINE_NAME = 'Vouch Context Eng
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server adapters/openclaw/vouch-context-engine.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vouch/auto_pr.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vouch/auto_pr.py:100`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( argv, cwd=cwd, input=stdin, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vouch/auto_pr.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vouch/capture.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vouch/capture.py:198`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: names = subprocess.run( ["git", "diff", "--name-only", "HEAD"], cwd=cwd, capture
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vouch/capture.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vouch/llm_draft.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vouch/llm_draft.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( llm_cmd, shell=True, cwd=tmp, input=prompt, capt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vouch/llm_draft.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vouch/pr_cache.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vouch/pr_cache.py:150`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: res = subprocess.run( ["gh", *args], check=False, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vouch/pr_cache.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/vouch/web/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/vouch/web/__init__.py:44`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(name) except ImportError: missing.append(name) if missing:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vouch/web/__init__.py
low Mutating tool "kb_eval_embeddings" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "kb_eval_embeddings" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool kb_eval_embeddings
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_capture.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_capture.py:242`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : str) -> None: subprocess.run( ["git", "-c", "user.email=t@t", "-c", "user.name=t", *args],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_capture.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:691`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = "latin-1" proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "vouch", *args], cwd=tmp_path, en
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_codex_adapter_load_real.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_codex_adapter_load_real.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: is not None return subprocess.run( [CODEX, *args], env=env, cwd=cwd, capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_codex_adapter_load_real.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_hub.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_hub.py:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) -> str: out = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True, check=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_hub.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_install_adapter.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_install_adapter.py:1080`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "hatchling") proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "hatchling", "build", "-t", "wheel", "-d", str(tm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_install_adapter.py
Tools 68
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
kb_eval_embeddingsruns code / shellkb_activityno sensitive capabilitykb_approveno sensitive capabilitykb_archiveno sensitive capabilitykb_auditno sensitive capabilitykb_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitykb_citeno sensitive capabilitykb_clear_claimsno sensitive capabilitykb_compileno sensitive capabilitykb_confirmno sensitive capability
Show 58 more tools ↓
kb_contextno sensitive capabilitykb_contradictno sensitive capabilitykb_crystallizeno sensitive capabilitykb_dedup_scanno sensitive capabilitykb_detect_themesno sensitive capabilitykb_diffno sensitive capabilitykb_digestno sensitive capabilitykb_doctorno sensitive capabilitykb_embeddings_statsno sensitive capabilitykb_expertsno sensitive capabilitykb_expireno sensitive capabilitykb_exportno sensitive capabilitykb_export_checkno sensitive capabilitykb_get_skillno sensitive capabilitykb_graph_exportno sensitive capabilitykb_impactno sensitive capabilitykb_import_checkno sensitive capabilitykb_index_rebuildno sensitive capabilitykb_lintno sensitive capabilitykb_list_claimsno sensitive capabilitykb_list_entitiesno sensitive capabilitykb_list_pagesno sensitive capabilitykb_list_pendingno sensitive capabilitykb_list_relationsno sensitive capabilitykb_list_sessionsno sensitive capabilitykb_list_skillsno sensitive capabilitykb_list_sourcesno sensitive capabilitykb_neighborsno sensitive capabilitykb_propose_claimno sensitive capabilitykb_propose_deleteno sensitive capabilitykb_propose_entityno sensitive capabilitykb_propose_pageno sensitive capabilitykb_propose_relationno sensitive capabilitykb_propose_themeno sensitive capabilitykb_provenance_rebuildno sensitive capabilitykb_read_claimno sensitive capabilitykb_read_entityno sensitive capabilitykb_read_pageno sensitive capabilitykb_read_relationno sensitive capabilitykb_register_sourceno sensitive capabilitykb_register_source_from_pathno sensitive capabilitykb_reindex_embeddingsno sensitive capabilitykb_rejectno sensitive capabilitykb_reject_extractedno sensitive capabilitykb_searchno sensitive capabilitykb_session_endno sensitive capabilitykb_session_startno sensitive capabilitykb_session_transcriptno sensitive capabilitykb_source_verifyno sensitive capabilitykb_statsno sensitive capabilitykb_statusno sensitive capabilitykb_summarize_sessionno sensitive capabilitykb_supersedeno sensitive capabilitykb_synthesizeno sensitive capabilitykb_traceno sensitive capabilitykb_triage_pendingno sensitive capabilitykb_volunteer_contextno sensitive capabilitykb_whyno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (68 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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