Docs (voltagent) MCP Server
@voltagent/docs-mcp
npm
v2.0.3
Published by @voltagent — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
VoltAgent docs-mcp - MCP Docs
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 1 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (examples/github-star-stories/src/tools.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/github-star-stories/src/tools.ts:13`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/users/${username}`, { method: "GET", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/github-star-stories/src/tools.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (examples/with-tavily-search/src/tools.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/with-tavily-search/src/tools.ts:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", { method: "POST", headers: { "C
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/with-tavily-search/src/tools.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (examples/with-whatsapp/src/webhooks/whatsapp.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/with-whatsapp/src/webhooks/whatsapp.ts:13`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://graph.facebook.com/v18.0/${phoneNumberId}/messages`, { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/with-whatsapp/src/webhooks/whatsapp.ts
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (examples/with-voltagent-actions/src/config.ts)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `examples/with-voltagent-actions/src/config.ts:66`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server examples/with-voltagent-actions/src/config.ts
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/next-js-chatbot-starter-template/lib/tools/calculator.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/next-js-chatbot-starter-template/lib/tools/calculator.ts:24`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ut const result = eval(sanitized); return { expression, result, success: true,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/next-js-chatbot-starter-template/lib/tools/calculator.ts
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_voltagent_changelogno sensitive capabilityget_voltagent_docno sensitive capabilityget_voltagent_exampleno sensitive capabilitylist_voltagent_changelogsno sensitive capabilitylist_voltagent_docsno sensitive capabilitylist_voltagent_examplesno sensitive capabilitysearch_voltagent_changelogsno sensitive capabilitysearch_voltagent_docsno sensitive capabilitysearch_voltagent_examplesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.3 latest |
A 98/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.0.2 |
A 98/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @voltagent/docs-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Docs 1
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