Voidly MCP Server
@voidly/mcp-server
npm
v2.17.0
Published by @voidly — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
84-tool MCP server: censorship intelligence (119 countries, 19.6M measurements) + E2E encrypted agent-to-agent messaging (Double Ratchet, X3DH, post-quantum) + Voidly Pay onboarding (agent-to-agent payments, x402, USDC on Base)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: agent_unread_count → agent_export_data → agent_join_channel. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow agent_unread_count → agent_export_data → agent_join_channel
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "agent_register_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "agent_register_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool agent_register_webhook · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
Tools 87
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
agent_export_datareads sensitive dataagent_join_channelnetwork egressagent_register_webhooknetwork egressagent_send_messagenetwork egressagent_unread_countingests untrusted inputagent_analyticsno sensitive capabilityagent_broadcast_taskno sensitive capabilityagent_corroborateno sensitive capabilityagent_create_attestationno sensitive capabilityagent_create_channelno sensitive capability
Show 77 more tools ↓
agent_create_taskno sensitive capabilityagent_deactivateno sensitive capabilityagent_delete_capabilityno sensitive capabilityagent_delete_messageno sensitive capabilityagent_discoverno sensitive capabilityagent_get_attestationno sensitive capabilityagent_get_broadcastno sensitive capabilityagent_get_consensusno sensitive capabilityagent_get_identityno sensitive capabilityagent_get_profileno sensitive capabilityagent_get_taskno sensitive capabilityagent_get_trustno sensitive capabilityagent_invite_to_channelno sensitive capabilityagent_key_pinno sensitive capabilityagent_key_pinsno sensitive capabilityagent_key_verifyno sensitive capabilityagent_list_broadcastsno sensitive capabilityagent_list_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityagent_list_channelsno sensitive capabilityagent_list_invitesno sensitive capabilityagent_list_tasksno sensitive capabilityagent_list_webhooksno sensitive capabilityagent_mark_readno sensitive capabilityagent_mark_read_batchno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_deleteno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_getno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_listno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_namespacesno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_setno sensitive capabilityagent_pingno sensitive capabilityagent_ping_checkno sensitive capabilityagent_post_to_channelno sensitive capabilityagent_query_attestationsno sensitive capabilityagent_read_channelno sensitive capabilityagent_receive_messagesno sensitive capabilityagent_registerno sensitive capabilityagent_register_capabilityno sensitive capabilityagent_relay_statsno sensitive capabilityagent_respond_inviteno sensitive capabilityagent_search_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityagent_trust_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityagent_update_profileno sensitive capabilityagent_update_taskno sensitive capabilityagent_verify_messageno sensitive capabilitycheck_domain_blockedno sensitive capabilitycheck_domain_probesno sensitive capabilitycheck_service_accessibilityno sensitive capabilitycheck_vpn_accessibilityno sensitive capabilitycompare_countriesno sensitive capabilityget_active_incidentsno sensitive capabilityget_alert_statsno sensitive capabilityget_censorship_indexno sensitive capabilityget_community_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityget_community_probesno sensitive capabilityget_country_statusno sensitive capabilityget_domain_historyno sensitive capabilityget_domain_statusno sensitive capabilityget_election_riskno sensitive capabilityget_high_risk_countriesno sensitive capabilityget_incident_detailno sensitive capabilityget_incident_evidenceno sensitive capabilityget_incident_reportno sensitive capabilityget_incident_statsno sensitive capabilityget_incidents_sinceno sensitive capabilityget_isp_risk_indexno sensitive capabilityget_isp_statusno sensitive capabilityget_most_censoredno sensitive capabilityget_platform_riskno sensitive capabilityget_probe_networkno sensitive capabilityget_risk_forecastno sensitive capabilityGlobal Censorship Indexno sensitive capabilityMethodologyno sensitive capabilityrelay_infono sensitive capabilityrelay_peersno sensitive capabilityverify_claimno sensitive capabilityVoidly Pay overviewno sensitive capabilityvoidly_pay_overviewno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (87 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.17.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @voidly/mcp-server --onlineMore in Data Science & ML
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