Voice Soundboard MCP Server
voice-soundboard
PyPI
v2.5.2
Published by mcp-tool-shop-org — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Text-to-speech for AI agents and developers. Compiler → Graph → Engine architecture.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (packages/core/src/ambient/redact.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`packages/core/src/ambient/redact.ts:22`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecrets?|private[_-]?key|id_rsa)[^\s]*/gi, // Email addresses (potential PII) /\b[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/core/src/ambient/redact.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/mcp-server/src/backend.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/mcp-server/src/backend.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import type { SynthesisRequest } from "@mcptoolshop/voice-soundboard-core"; //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/mcp-server/src/backend.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/mcp-server/src/backends/pythonBackend.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/mcp-server/src/backends/pythonBackend.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import { resolve } from "node:path"; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/mcp-server/src/backends/pythonBackend.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_soundboard/accessibility/screen_readers/orca.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_soundboard/accessibility/screen_readers/orca.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss result = subprocess.run( ["pgrep", "-x", "orca"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_soundboard/accessibility/screen_readers/orca.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_soundboard/accessibility/screen_readers/voiceover.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_soundboard/accessibility/screen_readers/voiceover.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["defaults", "read", "com.apple.universalaccess", "voiceOverOnOf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_soundboard/accessibility/screen_readers/voiceover.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_soundboard/runtime/registrar/bridge.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_soundboard/runtime/registrar/bridge.py:308`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["npm", "root", "-g"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_soundboard/runtime/registrar/bridge.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (voice_soundboard/security/sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`voice_soundboard/security/sandbox.py:329`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: >", "exec") exec(compiled, sandbox_globals) result.success = True resul
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server voice_soundboard/security/sandbox.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (packages/mcp-server/tests/helpers.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`packages/mcp-server/tests/helpers.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from "node:child_process"; import { resolve } from "node:path"; const CLI_PATH = resolve(import.meta.dirna
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/mcp-server/tests/helpers.ts
Tools 5
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
voice_dialogueno sensitive capabilityvoice_inner_monologueno sensitive capabilityvoice_interruptno sensitive capabilityvoice_speakno sensitive capabilityvoice_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.5.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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